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Abstract 
A review of the literature demonstrates a lack of research on fear-generalization 
processes in many anxiety disorders including obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Chapter 2 represents the first study that attempted 
to investigate the generalization of conditioned fear in individuals with obsessive-
compulsive traits using startle EMG and behavioral measures. The results of this study 
demonstrated that individuals with high levels of Threat Estimation as measured by the 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44) displayed overgeneralization of fear 
responses to a greater range of stimuli resembling the danger cue than those with low 
levels of Threat Estimation. In addition, despite etiological theories proposing that fear 
conditioning and overgeneralization of fear play prominent roles in the development and 
maintenance of PTSD, little research had been done on the neurobiological mechanisms 
that contribute to fear conditioning processes in PTSD patients and none have been 
specifically conducted on generalization. Chapter 3 investigated the neurobiological 
substrates associated with the overgeneralization of conditioned fear in PTSD patients 
using behavioral, skin conductance, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
measures. This study provides evidence that PTSD patients demonstrate 
overgeneralization of conditioned fear in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral 
insula, left and right caudate, left inferior parietal lobule, and right superior frontal gyrus. 
This body of work provides novel evidence regarding the generalization of conditioned 
fear in OCD and PTSD. 
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Chapter 1: The Contribution of Fear Conditioning to Pathological Anxiety 
An extensive literature has developed on the role of fear conditioning in the 
development of some forms of pathological anxiety. In fear-conditioning, conditioned 
fear occurs when an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US) is paired repeatedly with a 
neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus or CS) leading the neutral stimulus to elicit 
anxiety associated with the anticipation of the aversive stimulus (conditioned response or 
CR). This literature dates back to the classical conditioning studies conducted by Ivan 
Pavlov (1927) and John B. Watson and Rosalie Rayner (1920). Although Watson and 
Rayner’s (1920) Little Albert study demonstrated the pathologic effects of conditioned 
fear on human behavior, much of the early work in this area focused on learning in 
animals.  
Additionally, the literature on fear conditioning in anxiety disorders remained 
primarily theoretical rather than experimental for many years. During that time, a number 
of theories were developed to explain the role of conditioned fear in the etiology of 
anxiety pathology. Etiological accounts of pathological anxiety have focused on 
abnormalities in a number of processes including: overly strong acquisition of 
conditioned fear responses, failure to inhibit fear responses to conditioned safety, 
resistance to extinguish fear responses, actively avoiding stimuli that would lead to 
conditioned fear responses, impaired ability to learn cues that predict danger, and 
generalizing conditioned fear to stimuli that resemble the original threat.  
 An increase in the number of studies on fear conditioning in humans in recent 
years has been suggested to be due to the development of more sophisticated 
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conditioning models that refine our understanding of fear and anxiety (Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 1996) and to the identification of specific brain regions associated with fear 
conditioning in animals and humans (Lissek et al, 2005). As a result of this renewed 
interest, there have been a number of studies in recent years on fear conditioning in 
anxiety patients. This chapter will provide an integrative review of fear-conditioning 
theories and research related to specific anxiety disorders to elucidate the relationship 
between fear conditioning and pathological anxiety symptoms and to identify gaps of 
knowledge in the literature. Specifically, this review will focus on research related to 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and 
chapters 2 and 3 will report original research investigating fear-conditioning processes in 
each of these disorders. 
Associative Fear Learning Theories  
 Associative fear learning refers to the association of a neutral stimulus with an 
aversive event that lead that neutral stimulus to trigger a fear response even when 
encountered without the aversive outcome. In contrast, non-associative learning is not 
based on conditioning; rather, changes in a behavioral response to a stimulus occur in the 
absence of positive or negative outcomes. For instance, through repeated exposure, an 
individual can habituate or become sensitized to a stimulus. In the literature on 
pathological anxiety, the number and diversity of associative fear learning theories has 
surpassed non-associative learning accounts. This section will provide an overview of the 
prominent fear conditioning theories that have been proposed to be related to anxiety 
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disorders. Following this, the literature on fear-conditioning processes in PTSD and OCD 
will be reviewed. 
Failure to Extinguish 
 Extinction refers to a reduction in a previously learned response or CR following 
the repeated presentation of the CS in the absence of the US with which it was previously 
paired. Initially, it was proposed that extinction training caused the subject to “unlearn” 
or to erase the previously acquired association between the CS and US (Mackintosh, 
1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner & Rescorla, 1972). However, it is now 
accepted that extinction results in new learning rather than unlearning. During extinction, 
each time the CS is paired without the aversive stimulus, the subject is given the 
opportunity to re-encode information about the previously learned association. In other 
words, the subject encodes new information (the stimulus is safe) which competes for 
activation with the previously learned association (the stimulus is dangerous) and leads to 
the inhibition of the fear response to that stimulus (Bouton, 1993; Pearce, 1994; for a 
review, see Bouton, 2004). Additionally, extinction is not the result of forgetting. The 
passage of time alone is not sufficient for extinction to occur; extinction requires the 
presentation of the CS in the absence of the US (for an overview on extinction, see Myers 
& Davis, 2007).  
 Deficits in the ability to extinguish the fear response in the absence of danger can 
lead to the maladaptive persistence of anxiety symptoms, which has been suggested to be 
an essential feature of many anxiety disorders. Resistance to extinction may occur as the 
result of one of three processes: enhanced conditionability, deficits in inhibitory learning, 
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or "incubation." The enhanced conditionability account of resistance to extinction by 
Pitman and colleagues suggests that anxiety patients are characterized by enhanced 
acquisition of the CR and subsequent resistance to extinction (Orr et al., 2000; Peri et al., 
2000).  In other words, anxiety patients are predisposed to acquire the fear response to a 
greater degree than those without anxiety and this strongly formed association then 
makes extinction more difficult. The enhanced conditionability hypothesis is supported 
by the finding that fear conditioning is acquired more strongly in PTSD patients (Orr et 
al., 2000). 
 While the enhanced conditionability account focuses on abnormal levels of fear 
acquisition, a second theory proposes that deficits in inhibitory learning account for 
resistance to extinction (Davis, Falls, & Gewirtz, 2000; Jovanovic & Ressler, 2010). 
According to this account, anxious and nonanxious individuals show the same levels of 
acquisition of fear learning but deficits in extinction (inhibitory) learning result in failure 
to extinguish the fear response in anxiety patients. A deficit in the ability to learn new 
associations (the stimulus is now safe) and inhibit the CR would cause anxiety patients to 
have difficulty suppressing their fear response during extinction. The inhibitory learning 
theory is supported by research showing normative levels of conditioned fear acquisition 
but failure to suppress the learned fear response during extinction in anxiety patients 
(Howe, 1957; Pitman & Orr, 1986). These two theories (enhanced conditionability and 
deficits in inhibitory learning) can be described as the result of an overly strong 
acquisition memory and an insufficiently strong extinction memory, respectively (Lissek 
& Grillon, 2012). 
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 A third process by which resistance to extinction could occur was proposed by 
Eysenck (1976), who suggested the “incubation of fear” theory. According to this 
account, the CR creates an internal state of fear that functions as the US, thereby 
impeding extinction. Specifically, Eysenck suggests that anxious individuals experience 
the CR as significantly more “nocive” or unpleasant than non-anxious individuals. This 
arousal is suggested to be substantial enough to serve as a replacement for the US which 
not only results in resistance to extinction but has been suggested to “incubate” or 
enhance the CR over time. There are currently few studies that have directly tested the 
incubation hypothesis. 
 In addition to resistance to extinction, retention of the extinguished fear response 
is also relevant to research on fear conditioning and anxiety pathology. Following 
conditioned fear acquisition and extinction training, a retention test can be administered 
after a delay to determine the degree to which extinction learning persists over time. 
There is some evidence suggesting that abnormalities in the retention of extinction 
learning may be important to anxiety pathology. For example, anxiety disorder patients 
show impaired extinction recall after a delay following otherwise normative extinction 
learning (Milad et al., 2008; Milad et al., 2009). However, additional research on 
extinction retention is needed before inferences can be made regarding the contribution of 
this process to the maintenance of anxiety symptoms.  
 An extinguished conditioned response that reappears during retention tests can 
occur under several conditions, which are referred to as the reinstatement, renewal, or 
spontaneous recovery of the fear response (Myers & Davis, 2007). Reinstatement refers 
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to the re-emergence of the extinguished fear response during unanticipated presentations 
of the US. Renewal refers to the reappearance of the extinguished CR when the retention 
test occurs in a different context than the extinction training. Spontaneous recovery refers 
to the unanticipated re-emergence of the fear response following the passage of time 
without further extinction training. For a description of the typical experimental paradigm 
used in each type of retention test, see the fear conditioning paradigms section or refer to 
Myers and Davis (2007). We might expect that anxiety patients would show greater 
reinstatement, renewal, and/or spontaneous recovery of the fear response compared to 
non-anxious individuals.  
Mowrer's Two-Stage Learning/Avoidance 
 Mowrer’s two stage learning theory is closely associated with the failure to 
extinguish hypotheses. In this theory, avoidance is the primary mechanism by which 
subjects fail to extinguish maladaptive fear responses (Mowrer, 1947; 1960). In other 
words, a subject who avoids fear-related stimuli will never experience the exposure to the 
CS that is necessary for extinction to occur or will experience insufficient exposure to 
facilitate extinction. This theory is based on the extinction principle that subjects need to 
be given the opportunity to re-encode information about the previously learned CS-US 
association before the fear response can be extinguished. The anxiety patient has encoded 
the information that a stimulus is dangerous and without the opportunity for new learning 
to take place, this association receives no competition for activation with an inhibitory 
extinction memory (Lissek & Grillon, 2012). Because, according to this perspective, 
avoidance is the primary mechanism for extinction failure, it can be inferred from this 
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theory that anxious individuals would have normative levels of fear acquisition and 
possibly normative ability to extinguish the fear response. However, anxiety patients 
deprive themselves of the opportunity to extinguish the fear response through avoidance.  
 Mowrer’s two stage learning theory is supported in part by clinical research 
showing the effectiveness of exposure therapy in treating some types of anxiety disorders 
(Barlow, 2002; Mineka & Thomas, 2005; Parsons & Rizzo, 2008; Powers & 
Emmelkamp, 2008; Powers et al., 2010). When fears have been conditioned, the basis of 
exposure therapy is extinction: presenting the CS repeatedly without the aversive 
stimulus until the fear response declines. The importance of avoidance in maintaining 
anxiety symptoms is supported by research showing persistence of the conditioned fear 
response in participants who are given the opportunity to actively avoid the CS during 
extinction training (Lovibond et al., 2009). These results are applicable to the clinical 
setting where failure to reduce anxiety is observed in patients who actively avoid 
exposure by refusing treatment (noncompliance) or who use avoidance strategies (e.g., 
distraction) during therapy sessions (Grayson, Foa, & Steketee, 1982). Importantly, 
exposure therapy can only be compared to extinction learning if the original fear was 
conditioned; otherwise, exposure therapy is more akin to habituation. 
Failure to Inhibit Fear  
 The theory that pathological anxiety is associated with deficits in inhibitory 
learning during extinction is also applicable beyond the extinction literature. The 
impaired ability to inhibit a conditioned fear response has been suggested by Davis and 
colleagues (2000) and Jovanovic and Ressler (2010) to affect symptoms of anxiety more 
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broadly than simply resistance to extinction. Conditioned fear inhibition involves 
learning to discriminate between safety and danger cues in the environment and using 
safety cues as a signal to suppress the fear response. Deficits in inhibitory fear learning 
would lead to the expression of fear responses in the absence of danger, not only during 
extinction but during any process that relies on conditioned fear inhibition.  
 The validity of the conditioned fear inhibition theory is supported by studies 
demonstrating larger fear responses to learned safety cues in anxiety patients (Grillon & 
Morgan, 1999; Jovanovic et al., 2010; Orr et al., 2000; Peri et al., 2000) and in non-
clinical subjects with high levels of self-reported anxiety (Grillon & Ameli, 2001). 
However, studies finding that anxiety patients show enhanced fear responses to safety 
cues are mostly limited to PTSD patients. Some studies have been able to show a greater 
subjective expectation that the safety cue would be followed by an aversive stimulus in 
anxious or “neurotic” patients (Clum, 1969) and in individuals with social phobia 
(Hermann et al., 2002). An excessive fear response to safety cues is also predicted by the 
over-generalization of conditioned fear theory; however, the inhibition and the 
overgeneralization theories differ in their focus with the former concerned with inhibitory 
processes and the latter concerned with excitatory processes.  
Associative Learning Deficits 
 While Pitman and colleagues’ conditionability theory would predict that anxious 
subjects would be characterized by enhanced acquisition of the CR, a theory by Grillon 
(2002) proposed that anxious subjects would show the opposite: impaired acquisition of 
the conditioned fear response. Specifically, this theory is based on the notion that an 
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essential trait of anxiety is apprehension about unpredictability. This perceived sense of 
unpredictability could arise if anxious individuals are unable to learn which cues signify 
fear and which cues do not. Classical fear conditioning paradigms rely on predictability; 
conditioning does not occur if contingencies between stimuli are random. Therefore, fear 
conditioning provides an opportunity to test whether anxious individuals are aware of this 
predictability or whether they show deficits in learning fear associations.  
 If anxious individuals are less able to learn the association between the CS and 
US, the subject’s ability to predict danger and safety cues will be impaired, leading to 
what Grillon (2002) predicts will be a chronic state of anxiety. In other words, this theory 
postulates that the primary deficit leading to pathological anxiety is the inability of 
anxiety patients to effectively learn which specific cues indicate danger, leaving the 
danger unpredictable. Additionally, the inability to associate danger with a specific 
feature of the context will lead the person to associate the entire context with danger, 
resulting in contextual anxiety. Transference of fear to the context is supported by 
research showing that unpredictable presentations of the CS and US increase contextual 
fear (Grillon & Davis, 1997).  
 There are few studies that have sought to substantiate the hypothesis that 
pathological anxiety is related to associative learning deficits. Grillon (2002) was able to 
provide evidence supporting this theory by demonstrating that subjects with deficits in 
explicit cue fear conditioning (subjects who are unaware of the CS-US relationship) show 
increased physiological indicators of anxiety during the session and greater avoidance, as 
measured by failure to return for a second session. However, this study used healthy 
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participants, not anxiety patients. An additional study by Grillon et al. (2009) found that 
anxiety patients show greater fear responses during unpredictable presentations of the 
US, supporting the link between unpredictability and enhanced anxiety. Conversely, 
others do not find impaired associative learning in anxiety patients (Burriss, Ayers & 
Powell, 2007). 
Overgeneralization of Conditioned Fear 
 The generalization of conditioned fear refers to the transfer of the conditioned fear 
response to stimuli that resemble the original CS. Conditioned fear generalization was 
first demonstrated by Watson and Rayner (1920) in the “Little Albert” studies which 
showed that conditioning a child to fear a white rat led to the generalization of this fear to 
many other white furry animals and objects. Others have suggested the importance of the 
generalization of conditioned fear in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders (Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001; Goldstein & Chambless, 1978; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006). Intuitively, it would seem adaptive to fear animals or objects that 
resemble known dangers. However, as with other symptoms of anxiety, the excessive 
generalization of fear can become maladaptive when individuals continually perceive 
danger in harmless stimuli.  
 According to the generalization theory of conditioned fear, anxious individuals 
may be predisposed to have a lower threshold for threat reactivity; therefore, the degree 
of resemblance to the CS required to elicit the fear response would be reduced in anxiety 
patients (Lissek et al., 2010; Lissek & Grillon, 2012).  In other words, hyper-reactivity to 
threat would lead to the enhanced perception of danger in a greater range of benign 
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stimuli resembling the original threat. The generalization theory of conditioned fear 
would predict normative levels of acquisition of conditioned fear to danger cues but 
greater expression of that fear to a larger number of stimuli resembling the CS.  
 As mentioned previously, enhanced fear responses to safety cues would be 
predicted by both the overgeneralization of conditioned fear theory and the conditioned 
fear inhibition theory. Multiple studies have found that pathological anxiety is associated 
with exaggerated fear responses to safety cues (Clum, 1969; Grillon & Ameli, 2001; 
Grillon & Morgan, 1999; Hermann et al., 2002; Jovanovic et al., 2010; Orr et al., 2000; 
Peri et al., 2000), which could be taken as evidence supporting the overgeneralization 
theory. Additionally, studies using a paradigm designed specifically for testing the 
generalization of conditioned fear (see Lissek et al., 2008) found that anxiety patients 
show an enhanced fear response to a larger range of stimuli resembling the CS than 
healthy controls (Lissek et al., 2010; Lissek et al., under review), which supports the 
notion that anxiety is associated with overgeneralization of conditioned fear.  
Etiological Theories and Fear Conditioning Research in PTSD and OCD 
A meta-analysis by Lissek et al. (2005) found evidence that anxiety disorder 
patients are characterized by enhanced acquisition of the conditioned fear response and 
resistance to extinction in comparison to controls. However, the authors note that the 
contribution of associative fear learning likely varies by type of anxiety disorder, 
suggesting the importance of conducting studies investigating disorder-specific 
hypotheses. A review of the etiological theories and related fear conditioning studies 
associated with PTSD and OCD provides a better understanding of the relative 
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contribution of associative fear learning to these disorders. For each disorder, a brief 
overview of the relevant etiological theories will be provided and this information will be 
integrated with the findings from fear conditioning studies. A comprehensive review of 
the fear conditioning studies related to PTSD and OCD will be used to demonstrate the 
important role of associative fear learning in the development and/or maintenance of 
these disorders.  
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 Posttraumatic stress disorder develops in some individuals following an extreme 
traumatic stressor and is characterized by feelings of intense fear, helplessness, or horror, 
re-experiencing the event, increased arousal, and avoidance of stimuli associated with the 
traumatic event (PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Etiological models of 
PTSD have focused on a variety of theoretical frameworks regarding the biological and 
psychological vulnerabilities that may contribute to PTSD symptoms (for an overview, 
see Jones & Barlow, 1990). Two theoretical perspectives that are relevant to the current 
discussion are cognitive/information processing models and behavioral models. The 
cognitive/information processing perspective focuses on the “fear structure,” a memory 
network that stores information about fear relevant stimuli, appropriate responses, and 
interpretation of stimuli and responses. The significance and intensity of a traumatic 
event causes the fear structure to be more easily activated in PTSD patients which results 
in symptoms such as re-experiencing the event and avoidance of stimuli associated with 
the traumatic incident (Jones & Barlow, 1990).  
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 Similarly, the behavioral perspective also implicates the significance and intensity 
of a traumatic event as the cause of PTSD symptoms. According to this perspective, fear 
conditioning is the essential process that leads to the development of psychopathology to 
trauma. In a fear conditioning explanation of trauma psycholpathology, individuals who 
experience an aversive event are then conditioned to fear stimuli related to the traumatic 
event. When this conditioned fear is excessive and/or does not subside after the trauma, a 
diagnosis of PTSD may be given. In PTSD, the traumatic event is aversive enough 
(involves actual or threatened death or serious injury to self or others) to create a 
conditioned fear response after only a single experience. Symptoms of PTSD such as 
hypervigilance and enhanced startle reactions are thought to be directly related to this 
conditioning process. A fear conditioning explanation is especially relevant to PTSD 
since, unlike many other anxiety disorders, there is typically a direct association between 
a conditioning (traumatic) experience and subsequent fear-responding to trauma-relevant 
stimuli. 
 Research using fear conditioning paradigms supports this etiological account of 
PTSD. Fear conditioning accounts of PTSD have focused on abnormalities in the 
acquisition, extinction, associative learning, inhibition, overgeneralization, or avoidance 
of conditioned fear. Empirical evidence for each of these theories is mixed. Some studies 
find stronger acquisition of the fear response in PTSD patients (e.g Orr et al., 2000) while 
most others do not (Blechert et al., 2007; Grillon & Morgan, 1999; Milad et al., 2008; 
Milad et al., 2009; Peri et al., 2000), suggesting that overly strong acquisition of the 
conditioned fear response may not contribute substantially to PTSD symptoms. In terms 
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of the failure to extinguish theory, there is evidence that PTSD patients are characterized 
by resistance to extinction in some studies (Blechert et al., 2007; Norrholm et al., 2011; 
Orr et al., 2000; Peri et al., 2000; Wessa & Flor, 2007) but not others (e.g., Grillon & 
Morgan, 1999). Abnormalities in retention of extinction learning may be relevant to 
PTSD since some studies have found that PTSD patients show impaired extinction recall 
after a delay following otherwise normative extinction learning (Milad et al., 2008; Milad 
et al., 2009). However, additional research on extinction retention is needed to replicate 
these findings. 
 In support of the associative learning deficits theory, there is some evidence that 
PTSD is associated with sustained contextual anxiety (Grillon et al., 2009) which may 
constitute a risk factor for developing PTSD (Pole et al., 2009). However, others do not 
find associative learning deficits in PTSD patients (Burriss, Ayers, and Powell, 2007). A 
number of studies find enhanced fear responses to safety cues in PTSD patients using a 
discrimination learning paradigm (Grillon & Morgan, 1999; Grillon et al., 1998; 
Jovanovic et al., 2010; Orr et al., 2000; Peri et al., 2000), which supports both the 
inhibition of conditioned fear theory and, due to the perceptual similarity of the CS+ and 
CS-, the overgeneralization theory. Both theories would predict enhanced fear responses 
to safety cues either due to an inability to inhibit the fear response or the generalization of 
conditioned fear to the safety cue. However, based on the existing research, it is not 
possible to determine the relative contributions of inhibitory learning or 
overgeneralization to the maintenance of PTSD symptoms. Lastly, although the 
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avoidance theory predicts that conditioned fear will lead to the instrumental avoidance of 
trauma relevant stimuli, this hypothesis has not yet been systematically tested. 
 A well developed conceptual framework based on conditioned fear and empirical 
support from a number of fear conditioning studies suggests that an associative fear 
learning account of PTSD is a promising endeavor. What is now needed is additional 
research that can clarify the relative importance of the various fear conditioning theories 
in the development of PTSD. For example, research in this area would benefit from 
studies investigating the importance of specific fear conditioning theories that have been 
understudied, such as avoidance and extinction retention. Additionally, further research is 
needed to dissociate the contributions of the inhibitory learning theory from the 
overgeneralization theory.  
Obsessive-compulsive Disorder 
 Obsessive-compulsive disorder is characterized by obsessions (intrusive thoughts) 
that cause significant anxiety or distress and/or compulsions (repetitive acts) that are used 
to reduce anxiety (OCD; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The most common 
themes for obsessions are contamination, repeated doubts (e.g., whether the door is 
locked), a need to have things in a particular order, aggressive or horrific impulses (e.g., 
to hurt a family member), and sexual imagery. Compulsions are used to prevent or reduce 
anxiety or distress and are characterized by repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, 
checking, ordering) or mental acts (e.g., praying, counting). Etiological models of OCD 
propose a number of biological and psychological vulnerabilities that may contribute to 
OCD symptoms (for an overview, see Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009).  
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 One of the more widely accepted psychological models of OCD is the cognitive-
behavioral theory which proposes that unwanted cognitive intrusions are appraised by 
OCD patients as highly unacceptable or immoral, are believed to be personally important, 
and/or are thought to pose a threat for which the individual is personally responsible 
(Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009). Central to this perspective is the use of 
compulsions to avoid fear and anxiety associated with obsessions. The cognitive-
behavioral model proposes that compulsions become persistent because they provide 
negative reinforcement (temporary reduction in distress). Furthermore, compulsions serve 
as an avoidance strategy that prevents the individual from learning that obsessions will 
not result in harmful consequences.  
 Etiological theories do not typically implicate conditioned fear as the origin of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder; however, fear conditioning processes may still contribute 
to OCD symptoms. For example, overgeneralization may be pertinent to OCD. Anecdotal 
evidence for overgeneralization is apparent in descriptions of OCD symptoms; for 
example, an individual with a fear of contamination from a certain object may then 
generalize that fear to other objects or people that have been in contact with the original 
object. Additionally, patients with OCD have been suggested to overestimate threat levels 
(Myers et al., 2008). A tendency toward overestimating threats is an important precursor 
to conditioned generalization and may predict overgeneralization in OCD. Furthermore, 
patients with OCD show stronger amygdala involvement for both OCD-related images 
and general aversive images which has been interpreted as evidence of overgeneralization 
of the emotional response to non-symptom specific stimuli (Simon et al., 2010).  
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 There is currently little research on the generalization of conditioned fear in 
individuals with OCD. One study demonstrated that OCD patients show faster eyeblink 
conditioning relative to controls (Tracy et al., 1999); however, eyeblink conditioning is 
not equivalent to fear conditioning. Because of the lack of fear conditioning studies using 
OCD patients, inferences cannot be made about the role of associative fear learning in the 
maintenance of this disorder. Investigation of the generalization of conditioned fear in 
individuals with OCD is warranted. Additionally, research examining the acquisition, 
inhibition, and extinction of conditioned fear in OCD patients is needed. Associative 
learning deficits have also been understudied in OCD patients. Another possible direction 
in the research on fear conditioning in OCD would be to investigate instrumental 
avoidance in OCD patients since avoidance is thought to be an important feature of the 
cognitive-behavioral model of OCD. 
Neurobiological Mechanisms Associated with PTSD and OCD: Relation to Fear 
Conditioning 
 The purpose of this section is to review the neurobiological mechanisms 
implicated in PTSD and OCD and to integrate these findings with the fear conditioning 
literature. In particular, for each disorder there are very few (if any) fear conditioning 
studies that were conducted using imaging methods. Therefore, the following discussions 
for each anxiety disorder will begin with a broader review of patient-control differences 
in brain activation during a variety of tasks that extend beyond the fear conditioning 
literature. This will allow for an evaluation of the neural processes that may be abnormal 
in each anxiety disorder, which can be used to make inferences about common neural 
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deficits, some of which may be associated with abnormalities in fear conditioning 
processes. Before discussing disorder-specific imaging research, a brief overview of the 
general neural mechanisms associated with fear conditioning will be provided. 
 Neural structures that are thought to be important for fear conditioning include the 
amygdala, insula, hippocampus, the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST), and the 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex (Davis & Shi, 1999; Jovanovic & Ressler, 2010; Kim & 
Fanselow, 1992; Lissek et al., 2013; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992). The amygdala, part of the 
limbic system located in the medial temporal lobe, is thought to be involved in the 
expression of fear (Blaire et al., 2001; for a review, see Phan et al., 2002). The amygdala 
is comprised of several nuclei including the central nucleus, basolateral nucleus, and 
other nuclei. Lesions to the central nucleus of the amygdala inhibit fear-potentiated startle 
and freezing in rodents (Davis et al., 1982; LeDoux, 1992) and temporal lobectomy 
eliminates fear-potentiated startle in humans (Funayama et al., 2001). Additionally, fMRI 
studies show amygdala activation to the presentation of fear cues during fear conditioning 
(Bremner et al., 2005; Knight, 2005; LaBar et al., 1998; Phelps et al., 2004) and during 
threat of shock without actual administration of shock (Phelps et al., 2001).  
 The basolateral nucleus is thought to be important for forming CS-US 
associations during fear acquisition and for projecting to the central nucleus to activate or 
inhibit fear responses. The BNST is part of the extended amygdala and is associated with 
non-specific anxiety and depressive symptoms (Jovanovic & Ressler, 2010). The 
amygdala directly and indirectly receives sensory information from various brain regions 
including the thalamus and associative inputs from the hippocampus (Ehrlich et al., 
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2009). The hippocampus is thought to be important for the learning and consolidation of 
fear-related memory (Lissek & Grillon. 2012). Furthermore, the insula is associated with 
processing fear and disgust and increased activation of the insula has been documented 
during fear-conditioning (Lissek et al., 2013). Additionally, the ventral medial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC) has been shown to be important in inhibitory learning during extinction 
(Morgan, Romanski, & LeDoux, 1993) and may have inhibitory effects on the amygdala 
(Grace & Rosencrantz, 2002; Phelps et al., 2004). Pathological anxiety is thought to be 
associated with deficits in this complex neural circuitry (Jovanovic & Ressler, 2010). 
However, functional abnormalities in each of these regions vary between anxiety 
disorders. 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 Research on the neural processes associated with PTSD symptoms has shown 
abnormalities in functioning in several brain regions. There is evidence of abnormalities 
in activation of the insula, amygdala, dorsal medical prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rostral 
anterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and ventral medial prefrontal cortex of PTSD 
patients (Shin & Handweger, 2009; for a review, see Liberzon & Sripada, 2008). As 
mentioned previously, increased activation of the insula, amygdala, and dmPFC and 
decreased activation of the hippocampus and ventral medial prefrontal cortex are thought 
to be important in fear conditioning (e.g., Lissek et al., 2013). Non-fear conditioning 
studies using single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), PET, or fMRI find 
greater levels of insula, amygdala, and/or dmPFC activation while listening to trauma-
related scripts (Liberzon et al., 2007; Osuch, 2001; Rauch et al., 1996) and sounds 
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(Liberzon et al., 1999), while viewing trauma-related imagery (Bremner, et al., 1999; 
Shin, et al., 1999) and words (Protopopescu et al., 2005), and when viewing fearful faces 
(Rauch et al., 2000; Shin et al., 2005). Furthermore, non-fear conditioning studies have 
also documented decreased activation of the ventral medial prefrontal cortex in PTSD 
patients during symptom provocation (Bremner, et al., 1999; Osuch, 2001). The 
importance of these regions in PTSD patients is also supported by a meta-analysis by 
Etkin and Wager (2007). However, none of these studies employed a fear conditioning 
paradigm.  
 Studies using fear conditioning paradigms support the finding of abnormalities in 
these brain areas in PTSD. Bremner et al. (2005) found that PTSD patients showed 
increased activation in the left amygdala during fear acquisition and decreased activation 
in the anterior cingulate during extinction relative to controls. A study using 
discrimination fear conditioning found increased amygdala activation in PTSD patients 
relative to controls during extinction learning but decreased hippocampus and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation during extinction recall 24 hours later (Milad et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, a study using a discrimination fear conditioning experiment with 
threat of shock (not actual shock) found that PTSD patients show decreased ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex activity during threat of shock compared to controls (Tuescher et al., 
2011). Deficits in the ability of the vmPFC to inhibit amygdala activation have been 
suggested to contribute to abnormalities in associative fear learning in PTSD. The finding 
of excessive amygdala activation and decreased ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation 
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suggests that PTSD patients may be associated with abnormalities in inhibitory neural 
circuits.  
Obsessive-compulsive Disorder 
 Obsessive-compulsive disorder is thought to be linked to abnormal metabolic 
activity in a cortical-striatal circuit that includes pathways from the orbital frontal cortex, 
the anterior cingulate/caudal medial prefrontal cortex, and the caudate nuclei of the basal 
ganglia (Lucey et al., 1997; Rauch & Baxter, 1998; Saxena et al., 1998; Wilson, 1998; for 
a review, see Graybiel & Rauch, 2000). This circuit has been show to be hyperactive in 
OCD patients using electroencephalography (EEG), positron emission tomography 
(PET), magnetoencephalolgraphy (MEG), and MRI studies (for a review, see Stein, 
2000; 2002). There is also support for the role of the amygdala in the manifestation 
and/or maintenance of OCD symptoms. Several studies have found greater activation of 
the amygdala in response to symptom provocation in OCD patients (Breiter et al., 1996; 
van den Heuvel et al 2004, 2005; Simon et al., 2010). Other studies have also found 
differences in amygdala volume in OCD patients compared to controls (Szeszko et al 
1999). There are currently no imaging studies using a fear conditioning paradigm in OCD 
patients; therefore, more research is required before inferences can be made about the 
neural mechanisms associated with fear conditioning processes in OCD.  
Conclusion 
 A review of the literature on fear-conditioning processes in PTSD and OCD 
reveals a number of areas that would benefit from additional research. One notable gap in 
the literature is the lack of studies on the generalization of conditioned fear in PTSD, 
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despite etiological theories proposing that fear conditioning and overgeneralization of 
fear play prominent roles in the development and maintenance of this disorder. 
Additionally, little is known about the neurobiological mechanisms that contribute to fear 
generalization in PTSD. Some studies implicate the amygdala, insula, hippocampus, and 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex as possible regions of abnormal functioning in PTSD. 
However, it is important to note that various brain regions (e.g., the amygdala) are 
implicated in a number of diverse psychological processes besides fear conditioning. 
Therefore, conclusions about the brain mechanisms implicated in fear conditioning are 
tentative at best when no imaging studies employing a generalization paradigm exist. 
This highlights the need for additional imaging studies using a conditioned fear 
generalization paradigm with PTSD patients.  
Furthermore, a review of the literature also demonstrates a paucity of research on 
fear-conditioning processes in OCD. Research outside of the fear conditioning literature 
suggests that those with OCD may overgeneralize threat; however, no studies to date 
have investigated conditioned fear generalization processes in OCD. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to elucidate the role of the generalization of conditioned fear in PTSD and 
OCD. Chapter 2 reports on original research examining conditioned fear generalization in 
individuals with obsessive-compulsive traits using startle EMG. Chapter 3 investigates 
the neurobiological substrates associated with the overgeneralization of conditioned fear 
in PTSD patients using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as well as skin 
conductance and behavioral measures. And finally, chapter 4 will provide a general 
discussion of the implications of these studies and will discuss areas for future research.  
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Chapter 2: Generalization of Conditioned Fear and Obsessive-compulsive Traits 
As shown by the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, the overgeneralization of 
conditioned fear is thought to be an important feature of pathological anxiety. 
Overgeneralization of conditioned fear has been associated with panic disorder (Lissek et 
al., 2010) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Lissek et al., under review) and may 
be relevant to other anxiety disorders as well, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD). OCD is a chronic and debilitating disorder characterized by intrusive thoughts 
and repetitive acts to reduce anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Anecdotal evidence for overgeneralization is apparent in descriptions of OCD symptoms. 
An individual with a fear of contamination from a certain object may then generalize that 
fear to other objects or people that resemble the original object. For example, an OCD 
patient who encounters a particularly unsanitary public restroom may develop a fear of 
contamination from using not only that one restroom but all public restrooms. The threat 
posed by the one restroom has been generalized to all restrooms despite safety cues in the 
environment (e.g., apparent cleanliness) that should inhibit the fear response to sanitary 
public restrooms.  
Additionally, OCD has been linked to a tendency to overestimate threat 
(Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2009; Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2008) and the 
Obsessive-Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44) recognizes excessive threat estimation as one 
domain of symptoms related to OCD (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group, 2005). Overestimation of threat refers to beliefs that one’s environment is unsafe, 
despite evidence to the contrary. In the context of generalization, those high on threat 
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estimation should be over-reactive to stimuli resembling the danger cue even though the 
dissimilar part of the stimulus is actually a sign of safety. As such, a tendency toward 
overestimating threats may be an important precursor to conditioned generalization and 
may predict overgeneralization in OCD.  Furthermore, neuroimaging research supports 
the association between OCD and the possible overgeneralization of fear responses. 
Patients with OCD show stronger amygdala involvement for both OCD-related images 
and general aversive images, which has been interpreted as evidence of “generalized 
emotional hyperresponsivity” to non-symptom specific stimuli (Simon, Kaufmann, 
Müsch, Kischkel, & Kathmann, 2010).  
Despite the intuitive relationship between fear generalization and OCD, there is 
currently no research that systematically investigates the generalization of fear in 
individuals with obsessive-compulsive traits using fear conditioning paradigms. The 
purpose of the current study is to determine the degree to which individuals with 
obsessive-compulsive (OC) traits generalize conditioned fear when compared to healthy 
participants. In this study, participants completed a generalized fear conditioning task 
based on discriminative fear-conditioning as described in Lissek et al. (2010). In 
discriminative conditioning, two conditioned stimuli are presented, one that is paired with 
the unconditioned stimulus (referred to as the CS+ or danger cue) and one that is not 
paired with the unconditioned stimulus (CS- or safety cue). Within-subject effects are 
measured in discrimination conditioning as the difference in fear-potentiated startle 
amplitudes to the danger versus safety cues. The fear-potentiated startle response is the 
  25 
reliable enhancement of the startle reflex when a person is in a state of fear (Grillon, 
Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, & Davis, 1991). 
In addition to the presentation of CS+ and CS-, generalization stimuli forming a 
continuum of similarity between the CS+ and CS- are presented to test generalization 
effects. Specifically, this paradigm produces generalization gradients (slopes) where fear 
responses decrease as generalization stimuli become less similar to the conditioned 
danger cue (Lissek et al., 2008). Furthermore, these generalization gradients have been 
shown to differentiate between healthy participants and both panic disorder and 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) patients. Healthy participants show steep quadratic 
declines in fear responses to the generalization stimuli while responses in panic and GAD 
patients are characterized by linear, more gradual declines in fear responses to the 
generalization stimuli (Lissek et al., 2010, Lissek et al., under review). In other words, as 
stimuli become less similar to the danger cue, healthy participants are able to differentiate 
between the danger cue and approximations of the danger cue and their fear responses 
quickly decline. However, panic and GAD patients are less able to emotionally 
differentiate between the danger cue and its approximations; thus, they continue to show 
high levels of fear to stimuli that resemble the danger cue, suggesting overgeneralization 
of conditioned fear.  
The current study hypothesizes that individuals with OC traits will show 
overgeneralization of conditioned fear compared to controls as measured by startle 
potentiation and self-report ratings. Specifically, healthy participants are predicted to 
show quadratic generalization gradients, suggesting normal, more precipitous declines in 
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conditioned responding as the presented stimulus differentiates from CS+. Participants 
with OC traits are predicted to show linear declines in generalization gradients, 
suggesting overgeneralization of conditioned fear. In particular, this study is interested in 
the overestimation of threat since high levels of Threat Estimation as measured by the 
OBQ-44 are predicted to be associated with the overgeneralization of conditioned fear.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants included 59 adults (38 females, 21 males) whose ages ranged from 18 
to 30 years of age. Participants were selected based on their responses to the Obsessive-
Compulsive Inventory- Revised (OCI-R), a 18-item questionnaire that measures six 
dimensions of OCD symptoms including washing, obsessing, hoarding, ordering, 
checking, and neutralizing (Foa et al., 2002). This scale can be used to screen for the 
frequency of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and to measure symptom severity using a 
5-point Likert scale of subjective distress. The OCI-R has been shown to have adequate 
psychometric properties in both clinical and nonclinical samples (Fullana et al., 2005; 
Hajcak, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004; Huppert et al., 2007).  
A total of 470 undergraduates completed the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-
Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) using a secure online survey. From these students, 59 
individuals met the criteria for this study and were recruited for the psychophysiological 
recording session based on their total OCI-R score. The present study adopts Foa et al.’s 
(2002) recommendation that a clinically significant cutoff is an OCI-R score of 21 or 
greater. Using this criterion, two similarly sized groups were selected: a high obsessive-
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compulsive group (OCI-R ≥ 21) consisting of 28 individuals (16 females, 12 males) and a 
low obsessive-compulsive group (OCI-R ≤ 20) composed of 31 individuals (22 females, 
9 males). Foa et al.’s (2002) recommended cutoff score of 21 on the OCI-R does not 
imply that an individual with a score of 21 or greater would be diagnosed with OCD; 
instead, a score of 21 or greater suggests that the participant endorses obsessive-
compulsive symptoms to a greater extent than expected in a healthy sample. Table 2.1 
shows the demographics for the high and low obsessive-compulsive groups. There were 
no between-group differences in age.  
 
Table 2.1 
Group characteristics for the high and low obsessive-compulsive groups 
 Low Obsessive-
Compulsive  
High Obsessive-
Compulsive  
Sample size (females, 
males)  
31 (22, 9)  28 (16, 12)  
Age in years  20.68 (3.91)  21.29 (3.13)  
OCI-R  5.63* (6.65)  30.21* (8.59)  
OBQ-44  132.17* (32.07)  176.36* (33.10)  
BDI  5.16* (5.72)  17.69* (8.93)  
SAI 32.84* (9.08)  45.76* (9.12) 
Note. Group means and (standard deviations) are reported; Significant group differences 
(p < .05) are denoted with an asterisk. OCI-R = the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-
Revised; OBQ-44 = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; BDI = the Beck Depression 
Inventory; SAI = State Anxiety Inventory. 
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 Overestimation of threat was measured with the Threat Estimation subscale of the 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44). The OBQ-44 was developed by the 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group to measure beliefs that are thought to 
be related to the maintenance of OCD (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group (OCCWG), 2001). It consists of six belief domains: Responsibility, Threat 
Estimation, Perfectionism, Intolerance of Uncertainty, Importance of Thoughts, and 
Control of Thoughts. The OBQ-44 has demonstrated convergent validity with measures 
OCD symptoms and OBQ-44 total scores have been shown to be significantly higher in 
OCD patients than community controls, student controls, and anxious controls (OCCWG, 
2005). A factor analysis suggested these items could be grouped into three belief 
dimensions: Responsibility/Threat Estimation, Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty, 
Importance/Control of Thoughts (OCCWG, 2005). The use of the Threat Estimation 
items as a scale of overestimation of threat is supported by a later factor analysis of the 
OBQ-44 that suggests that the Threat Estimation subscale is a unique factor (Meyers, 
Fischer, & Wells, 2008). The high Threat Estimation group (Threat Estimation ≥ 21) 
consisted of 32 individuals (17 females, 15 males) while the low Threat Estimation group 
(Threat Estimation ≤ 20) consisted of 27 individuals (21 females, 6 males). Table 2.2 
shows the demographics for the high and low Threat Estimation groups. No between-
group differences in age were apparent. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing and no 
history of a major neurological condition. Participants were excluded if they were 
currently using psychoactive medications. This study was approved by the University of 
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Minnesota Institutional Review Board and informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. Participants received extra credit in an introductory course for their 
participation.  
 
Table 2.2 
Group characteristics for the high and low Threat Estimation groups 
 Low Threat Estimation  High Threat Estimation  
Sample size (females, 
males)  
27 (21, 6)  32 (17, 15)  
Age in years  21.19 (4.10)  20.78 (3.06)  
Threat Estimation from 
the OBQ-44 
14.56* (3.63) 26.88* (5.27) 
OCI-R  8.83* (9.26)  24.44* (14.38)  
BDI  6.27* (6.78)  15.11* (9.99)  
SAI 33.75* (6.61)  43.38* (12.29) 
Note. Group means and (standard deviations) are reported; Significant group differences 
(p < .05) are denoted with an asterisk. OCI-R = the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-
Revised; OBQ-44 = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; BDI = the Beck Depression 
Inventory; SAI = State Anxiety Inventory. 
 
Physiological Apparatus 
Fear-potentiated startle was recorded using a commercial system (PsychLab 
psychophysiologic recording system, Precision Instruments), which also administered 
mild electric shocks to the non-dominant wrist of subjects. The shocks were delivered 
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through two-disk electrodes placed on the participants’ non-dominant wrist. Participants 
received between 1-3 sample shocks prior to the start of the experiment, which they rated 
in terms of painfulness on a scale from 0 (no pain) to 5 (extremely painful). The shock 
level was adjusted based on our assessment of their tolerance. The shocks had an 
intensity between 3 to 5 milliamperes and duration of 100 ms. Fear-potentiated startle 
(startle blink or electromyography) was measured using two 6mm silver-chloride 
electrodes positioned under the left eye (sampling rate=1000 Hz; bandwidth=30–500 Hz). 
A ground electrode was placed on the participant’s non-dominant forearm. Startle probes 
consisted of 40ms, 102 dBA bursts of white noise with a near instantaneous rise time 
presented binaurally through headphones.  
Conditioned Generalization Paradigm 
The conditioned generalization paradigm used in this study has been described in 
detail elsewhere (Lissek et al., 2008; 2010). This paradigm involves the presentation of 
10 rings of gradually increasing size, where the largest and smallest rings serve as the 
conditioned danger cue (paired with an unconditioned stimulus; CS+) or the conditioned 
safety cue (not paired with an unconditioned stimulus; CS-). An electric shock (3–5 mA) 
delivered to the participant’s non-dominant wrist was used as the unconditioned stimulus. 
The generalization stimuli consisted of eight intermediately sized rings that form a 
continuum of similarity between the CS+ and CS- (see Figure 2.1). Rings were presented 
for eight seconds on a computer monitor using Presentation software. Prior to the start of 
the study, participants underwent habituation to nine startle probes. 
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Figure 2.1: Conditioning and Generalization Stimuli. Groups were counterbalancing so 
that for half of the participants, the largest ring was the conditioned danger cue and the 
smallest ring was the safety cue (counterbalancing group A) and for the other half, the 
stimuli were reversed (counterbalancing group B). The eight intermediate ring sizes were 
grouped into four classes (C1, C2, C3, and C4) to avoid an excessive number of trials 
while maintaining a gradual continuum of ring sizes (see Lissek et al., 2010). 
 
The conditioned generalization paradigm consists of three phases: preacquisition 
(presentation of the CS- and CS+ stimuli without shocks), acquisition (fear conditioning 
with the CS- and CS+), and generalization (presentation of the CS-, CS+, and the eight 
generalization stimuli). The trial types and frequencies for each phase are listed in table 
2.3. During each phase, half of the trials were followed by startle probes that occurred 4 
or 5 seconds after onset of the conditioned or generalization stimulus. A balanced number 
of startle probes were presented during inter-trial intervals. Startle probes were separated 
by 18-25 second time intervals throughout the study.  
During stimulus trials and inter-trial intervals without startle probes, behavioral 
ratings (perceived risk for shock) and response times were collected. Participants were 
shown the question “Level of risk?” presented above the stimulus 1 to 2 seconds after 
trial onset, which cued participants to rate their perceived likelihood of receiving a shock 
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on a 3-point scale (1=no risk, 2=moderate risk, and 3=high risk). Participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly as possible with their dominant hand using a subject 
response box. Additionally, retrospective self-reported levels of anxiety evoked by 
conditioned danger and conditioned safety cues were collected using 10-point Likert 
scales (1=none, 5=some, 10=a lot) following the acquisition and generalization phases. 
 
Table 2.3 
Trial types and frequencies during preacquisition, acquisition, and generalization test 
Conditioning and Generalization Stimuli 
 CS+  
Phase CS- C1 C2 C3 C4 Coterminated 
with UCS 
Not Coterminated 
with UCS 
ITI 
Preacquisition 6 - - - - 0 6 6 
Acquisition 12 - - - - 9 3 12 
Generalization test 12 12 12 12 12 6 6 12 
Note. CS−=conditioned safety cue; CS+=conditioned danger cue; C1, C2, C3, and 
C4=generalization stimulus classes 1, 2, 3, and 4; UCS=unconditioned stimulus; 
ITI=inter-trial intervals. During the generalization test, the CS+ continued to be 
reinforced with shock to avoid extinction of the conditioned response during the 
generalization sequence.  
 
Mood and Anxiety Questionnaires 
 Prior to the physiological recording session, participants completed a battery of 
questionnaires online including the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 
2005), the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002), the State 
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), and the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987) as well as a demographics 
questionnaire.  
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Data Analysis 
 Startle electromyography (EMG) raw data was rectified and smoothed using a 20 
ms moving window average. The onset latency window for the startle EMG response was 
20–100 ms. Peak EMG magnitude was determined by taking the peak value between 21 
and 120 ms following stimulus onset (startle probe) and subtracting the average baseline 
EMG level 50 ms prior to the stimulus onset. For each trial, a zero response was scored if 
no peak magnitude was detectable (i.e., EMG magnitude less than 1 microvolt). Criteria 
for trial rejection included unstable baseline EMG activity or peak EMG magnitudes 
occurring within 20 ms of startle probe onset. The percentage of trials that were rejected 
based on these criteria was similar in the high and low OCI-R groups as well as the high 
and low Threat Estimation groups. 
EMG magnitudes were standardized using with-in subject T scores. EMG 
magnitudes during acquisition phase were analyzed with a 2×2 repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA): group (high and low OCI-R) by stimulus (danger cue and 
safety cue). EMG magnitudes during the generalization phase were analyzed with a 2×6 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA): group (high and low OCI-R) by 
stimulus type (safety cue, Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, Class 4, and danger cue). Four 
individuals were excluded from startle EMG analyses because of equipment problems. 
ANOVAs were computed using Wilks’s lambda and were followed, when necessary, by 
either trend analyses or paired-samples t tests. Geisser-Greenhouse corrections were used 
when there were violations of the sphericity assumption. The shape of generalization 
gradients were tested using quadratic trend analyses based on a priori predictions that the 
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high OC and high Threat Estimation groups would show a more linear gradient of EMG 
magnitudes which would reflect greater generalization in these groups. Risk ratings and 
startle EMG magnitudes were transformed into a measure of deviation from linearity 
(Mean(CS+ and CS-) - Mean (Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4)) in order to obtain a single 
continuous measure that characterizes the generalization slope, which can then be 
correlated with other variables of interest such as symptom questionnaires. Alpha was set 
at 0.05 and was corrected using Hochberg’s adjustment for multiple tests where 
appropriate (Hochberg, 1988).  
Results 
Pre-Acquisition 
 During pre-acquisition, no main effects of stimulus type or stimulus type-by-
group interactions were found for startle EMG, suggesting that prior to conditioning, 
there were no group differences in startle reactions for the danger and safety cues in 
either the high and low OCI-R groups or the high and low Threat Estimation groups (p-
values ≥ .14). 
Acquisition 
 Startle EMG. Means and standard deviations are displayed in table 2.4 for the 
high and low OCI-R groups and table 2.5 the high and low Threat Estimation groups. A 
2x2 group-by-stimulus ANOVA revealed significant main effects for stimulus type in the 
high and low OCI-R groups (F(1, 54)=40.77, p < .001) and in the high and low Threat 
Estimation groups (F(1, 54)=39.22, p < .001). Fear potentiated startle was greater for the 
danger cue than the safety cue in both the high OCI-R (t(26)=4.31, p < .001) and low 
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OCI-R (t(28)=4.84, p < .001) groups as well as the high Threat Estimation (t(30)=4.31, p 
< .001) and low Threat Estimation (t(24)=5.22, p < .001) groups, showing that all groups 
were able to condition to the danger cue. There were no significant group-by-stimulus 
interactions during acquisition, suggesting that the strength of the fear potentiated startle 
did not differ across groups (p-values ≥ .48). 
 Retrospective anxiety. Conditioning to the danger cue was also apparent using 
self-reported measures of anxiety administered post-acquisition. Higher levels of anxiety 
to the conditioned danger cue compared to the conditioned safety cue were reported in 
both the high OCI-R group (t(27)= 7.96, p < .001, danger cue: Mean= 8.04, SD=1.90, 
safety cue: Mean= 3.68, SD= 2.20) and the low OCI-R group (t(30)= 10.83, p < .001, 
danger cue: Mean= 7.26, SD= 1.95, safety cue: Mean= 2.61, SD= 1.33). Higher levels of 
anxiety to the conditioned danger cue were also reported in both the high Threat 
Estimation group (t(31)= 9.65, p < .001, danger cue: Mean= 8.06, SD= 1.78, safety cue: 
Mean= 3.50, SD= 2.11) and the low Threat Estimation group (t(26)= 8.86, p < .001, 
danger cue: Mean= 7.11, SD= 2.04, safety cue: Mean= 2.67, SD= 1.41) . No stimulus 
type-by-group interactions were found (p-values ≥ .68); however, main effects for group 
were found (OCI-R: F(1, 57)= 7.28, p = .009; Threat Estimation: F(1, 57)= 6.74, p = 
.012) indicating that the high OCI-R group and the high Threat Estimation group reported 
greater anxiety to both the danger and safety cues than the low OCI-R or low Threat 
Estimation groups.   
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Table 2.4 
 
Acquisition data for standardized startle EMG across conditioned danger cues (CS+), 
conditioned safety cues (CS–), and inter-trial intervals for the high and low OCI-R 
groups 
 
 Startle EMG
a
 
Stimulus High OCI-R Low OCI-R 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
CS+ 54.75 4.51 55.60 4.28 
CS- 49.20 4.25 51.16 3.18 
ITI 51.22 4.49 49.42 3.06 
a
Raw startle EMG was standardized with the use of within-subject T score 
transformations ([([EMG single trial – EMGmean]/SD)*10] + 50). OCI-R = Obsessive-
compulsive Inventory-Revised; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; CS- = conditioned safety 
cue; ITI = inter-trial interval. 
 
Table 2.5 
 
Acquisition data for standardized startle EMG across conditioned danger cues (CS+), 
conditioned safety cues (CS–), and inter-trial intervals for the high and low Threat 
Estimation groups as measured by the OBQ-44 
 
 Startle EMG
a
 
Stimulus High Threat Estimation Low Threat Estimation 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
CS+ 55.36 4.60 54.99 4.16 
CS- 50.07 4.65 50.39 2.55 
ITI 51.04 4.10 49.36 3.46 
a
 Raw startle EMG was standardized with the use of within-subject T score 
transformations ([([EMG single trial – EMGmean]/SD)*10] + 50). OCI-R = Obsessive-
compulsive Inventory-Revised; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; CS- = conditioned safety 
cue; ITI = inter-trial interval. 
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Generalization Test 
 Startle EMG. A 2x2 stimulus type-by-group repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
significant main effects for stimulus type (safety vs. danger cue) in the high and low OCI-
R groups (F(1, 53)=31.85, p < .001) and in the high and low Threat Estimation groups 
(F(1, 53)=33.66, p < .001). Fear potentiated startle was greater for the danger cue than 
the safety cue in both the high OCI-R (t(25)=3.63, p = .001) and low OCI-R (t(28)=4.38, 
p < .001) groups as well as the high Threat Estimation (t(29)=3.39, p = .002) and low 
Threat Estimation (t(24)=4.86, p < .001) groups, which suggests that conditioned fear to 
the danger cue persisted during the generalization test. No significant stimulus type-by-
group interactions were found (p-values ≥ .29). No gender differences were found in 
startle EMG magnitudes for any of the stimuli: safety cue, Classes 1-4, or danger cue (p-
values ≥ .40).  
 A 2x6 repeated measures ANOVA revealed main effects of stimulus type for the 
high and low OCI-R groups (F(5,49)=10.44, p < .001) and the high and low Threat 
Estimation groups (F(5,49)=10.91, p < .001). Specifically, the generalization gradients 
were characterized by downward slopes in startle magnitude as the stimulus becomes less 
similar to the conditioned danger cue (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Both the high and low 
OCI-R groups showed significant quadratic slopes (F(1,53)=23.96, p < .001) with no 
significant stimulus type-by-group interaction (p = .69). The high and low Threat 
Estimation groups also showed significant quadratic slopes (F(1,53)=25.85, p < .001) and 
there was an interaction between Threat Estimation group and response slopes from the 
danger cue to stimulus Class 4 (F(1,53)=6.30, p = .015). The low Threat Estimation 
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group showed a steep decline in fear potentiated startle between the danger cue and the 
next class of stimuli (Class 4) while the high Threat Estimation group shows a less steep 
decline in fear potentiated startle (see Figure 2.3).  
 Planned comparisons between the conditioned safety cue and the four classes of 
generalization stimuli, as well as the danger cue, were conducted to determine the point at 
which startle magnitude was significantly different from the safety cue, indicating that 
discrimination learning (the opposite of generalization) has occurred. These five contrasts 
were corrected for multiple comparisons using Hochberg’s adjustment. Using a criterion 
of p = .02, the results show that startle EMG magnitudes were significantly larger for the 
danger cue than for the safety cue in both the high OCI-R group (p = .001) and low OCI-
R group (p < .001), suggesting that both groups conditioned to the danger cue to the same 
degree. Similarly, startle EMG magnitudes were also larger for the danger cue than for 
the safety cue in both the high Threat Estimation group (p = .002) and the low Threat 
Estimation group (p < .001). Startle EMG magnitudes did not significantly differ between 
the safety cue and the other classes of generalization stimuli in either the high or low 
OCI-R groups.  
 In contrast, startle magnitudes were significantly larger for the Class 4  
generalization stimuli than for the safety cue in the high Threat Estimation group 
(t(29)=3.14, p = .004) but were not larger relative to the safety cue in the low Threat 
Estimation group (t(24)=1.27, p = .22). The low Threat Estimation group was able to 
suppress the fear response to the next class of stimuli that resembled the danger cue while 
the high Threat Estimation group showed similar levels of fear to both the danger cue and 
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the next class of similarly sized stimuli, suggesting overgeneralization of the conditioned 
fear response.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Average standardized startle EMG magnitudes during the generalization test 
by group (high and low Obsessive-compulsive Inventory-Revised), for the inter-trial 
interval (ITI), safety cue (CS–), four classes of generalization stimuli (C1, C2, C3, C4), 
and danger cue (CS+). Black dots indicate that the startle EMG magnitudes were 
significantly larger for the danger cue than for the safety cue. 
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Figure 2.3. Average standardized startle EMG magnitudes during the generalization test 
by group (high and low Threat Estimation), for the inter-trial interval (ITI), safety cue 
(CS–), four classes of generalization stimuli (C1, C2, C3, C4), and danger cue (CS+). 
Black dots indicate that the startle EMG magnitudes were significantly larger for the 
danger cue and class 4 (C4) than for the safety cue in the high Threat Estimation group, 
but were only larger for the danger cue in the low Threat Estimation group.  
 
Risk ratings. During generalization, no main effects for group or stimulus type-
by-group interactions were found for risk ratings in either the high and low OCI-R groups 
or the high and low Threat Estimation groups (p-values ≥ .068). There was a significant 
main effect for stimulus type in the high and low OCI-R groups and the high and low 
Threat Estimation groups (p-values < .001). The high and low OCI-R groups and the high 
and low Threat Estimation groups were characterized by significant quadratic declines in 
risk ratings as the stimuli decreased in similarity to the conditioned danger cue (p-values 
≤ .005). Risk ratings and startle EMG magnitudes were transformed into a measure of 
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deviation from linearity (Mean(CS+ and CS-) - Mean (Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4)). Using 
these measures, risk ratings were positively correlated with startle EMG magnitudes 
(r(53) = .40, p = .003), suggesting that higher risk ratings are associated with more linear 
(less steep) declines in startle EMG as the stimuli become less similar to the conditioned 
danger cue. 
 Reaction times. In the high and low OCI-R groups and the high and low Threat 
Estimation groups, no stimulus type-by-group interactions were found for reaction times 
(p-values ≥ .58). No main effect for group was found for the OCI-R groups (p = .37). 
Although the main effect for group did not reach significance in the Threat Estimation 
groups either (p = .055), comparisons of the means suggests slower response times in the 
high Threat Estimation group for all stimuli (safety cue, Classes 1-4, and danger cue). For 
the reactions times, a significant main effect for stimulus type was found (p-values = 
.001). All groups were characterized by an inverted U shape, suggesting slower reaction 
times to the generalization stimuli (Classes 2, 3, and 4), consistent with previous research 
showing slower responding for stimuli with less certain threat information than the 
conditioned danger and safety cues (Lissek et al., 2010). 
 Symptom questionnaires. The State Anxiety Inventory was positively correlated 
with Threat Estimation (r(57) = .52, p < .001) as was the BDI (r(56) = .61, p < .001). 
Correlations between these measures and risk ratings or startle magnitudes were not 
significant (p-values ≥ .37). 
 Retrospective anxiety. Self-reported levels of anxiety also show that conditioned 
anxiety for the danger cue persisted during the generalization test. Higher levels of 
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anxiety to the conditioned danger cue were reported in both the high OCI-R group (t(27)= 
9.35, p < .001, danger cue: Mean= 7.86, SD=2.55, safety cue: Mean= 2.32, SD= 1.52) 
and the low OCI-R group (t(30)= 15.09, p < .001, danger cue: Mean= 6.77, SD= 2.03, 
safety cue: Mean= 1.42, SD= .67). There was a main effect for group suggesting higher 
self-reported levels of anxiety to both the danger and safety cues in the high OCI-R group 
but not the low OCIR group (F(1,57) = 9.01, p = .004). No stimulus type-by-group 
interaction was found, suggesting that the pattern of anxiety levels to the danger and 
safety cues did not differ between the groups (p = .79). Higher levels of anxiety to the 
conditioned danger cue were also reported in both the high Threat Estimation group 
(t(31)= 11.02, p < .001, danger cue: Mean= 7.63, SD= 2.45, safety cue: Mean= 2.09, SD= 
1.47) and the low Threat Estimation group (t(26)= 12.30, p < .001, danger cue: Mean= 
6.89, SD= 2.17, safety cue: Mean= 1.56, SD= .80). No significant main effect for group 
or stimulus type-by-group interaction was found (p-values ≥ .07). 
Discussion 
 This study represents the first attempt to study the generalization of conditioned 
fear in individuals with obsessive-compulsive traits. The results of this study suggest that 
individuals with high levels of Threat Estimation as measured by the Obsessive Beliefs 
Questionnaire (OBQ-44) display overgeneralization of fear responses to a greater range 
of stimuli resembling the danger cue than those with low levels of Threat Estimation. In 
particular, the high Threat Estimation group showed greater fear-potentiated startle to 
ring sizes up to two units of dissimilarity from the danger cue while the low Threat 
Estimation group did not generalize the conditioned fear response beyond the danger cue. 
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This suggests that the high Threat Estimation group may be characterized by lower 
thresholds of threat reactivity, which results in greater fear responses to stimuli that 
resemble the danger cue.  
 Similar to the animal literature and to previous research on the generalization of 
conditioned fear in humans (Lissek et al., 2009; 2010), this study found that the 
generalization gradients were characterized by quadratic declines in conditioned fear as 
the presented stimuli became less similar to the danger cue. Unlike the Lissek et al. 
(2010) study, the present study was not able to replicate the more gradual, linear declines 
in conditioned fear responding that the authors found in individuals with panic disorder. 
This divergence in findings may be due to the type of population used in the present 
study. A limitation to the current study is use of a non-clinical population of individuals 
with obsessive-compulsive traits rather than patients with OCD. Linear declines in 
conditioned fear responding may be more apparent when using clinical patients with 
OCD. It is also possible that linear declines in fear responding are more characteristic of 
particular anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder and GAD, rather than obsessive-
compulsive disorder.  
 No differences in generalization were found when comparing individuals with 
high and low levels of overall obsessive-compulsive symptoms as measured by the 
Obsessive-compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R). Generalization effects in this study 
were restricted to comparisons between the high and low Threat Estimation groups from 
the OBQ-44, suggesting that only a subset of individuals with obsessive-compulsive traits 
show overgeneralization. The lack of group differences in the high and low obsessive-
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compulsive groups may also be due to the lack of disorder-relevant conditioned stimuli 
used in this study’s experimental paradigm. Lissek, Pine, and Grillon (2006) have noted 
that paradigms that use threat of shock as the unconditioned stimulus may not be as 
pertinent to anxiety disorders where threat of physical harm is not a key feature. For 
example, fear of physical harm is characteristic of posttraumatic stress disorder but is less 
relevant to obsessive-compulsive disorder. Experimental paradigms that use 
unconditioned stimuli such as contamination may be more successful at finding group 
differences in fear responses in obsessive-compulsive populations.  
 Furthermore, the finding of greater generalization in the high Threat Estimation 
group compared to the low Threat Estimation group and no differences in the high and 
low obsessive-compulsive groups may be due to overestimation of threat being non-
specific to OCD. Research using the OBQ-44 subscales has suggested that beliefs about 
the importance of thoughts and control of thoughts reliably differentiate OCD patients 
from other non-obsessive anxiety patients whereas other dimensions such as threat 
estimation, responsibility, perfectionism, and intolerance of uncertainty may be less 
specific to OCD (Anholt et al., 2006; Clark, Purdon, & Wang, 2003; Sica et al., 2004; 
Tolin, Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2006). In particular, overestimation of threat is common 
across many anxiety disorders including GAD, OCD, PTSD, and panic disorder. 
Therefore, we would expect to find overgeneralization in other disorders characterized by 
high levels of threat reactivity and this has been supported in research on panic and GAD 
patients and is currently being investigated by the authors in PTSD patients. The current 
study’s finding of overgeneralization in those high in Threat Estimation coupled with 
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previous research showing greater generalization in anxiety disorders characterized by 
threat reactivity supports the notion of overestimation of threat possibly being one 
important process underlying the overgeneralization of fear.   
 In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that overestimation of threat may 
be an important precursor to the generalization of conditioned fear. In particular, group 
differences in conditioned generalization were only found in the high and low Threat 
Estimation groups as measured by the OBQ-44 and not in the high and low obsessive-
compulsive groups as measured by the OCI-R. This suggests that not all individuals with 
OCD traits are characterized by overgeneralization of fear; specifically, individuals who 
overestimate threat appear to be at risk for overgeneralizing their fear. The 
overgeneralization of conditioned fear remains an important but understudied process in 
the research on anxiety disorders. Future studies in this area would benefit from the use 
disorder-specific unconditioned stimuli and from the replication of the current study’s 
results in a population of OCD patients. 
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Chapter 3: The Generalization of Conditioned Fear in PTSD 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterized by feelings of intense fear, 
helplessness, or horror, increased arousal, and avoidance following a traumatic event 
(PTSD; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Etiological explanations of PTSD posit 
fear conditioning as a primary mechanism by which symptoms of PTSD are developed 
and maintained. Conditioned fear results from the pairing of an unconditioned aversive 
stimulus (US) with a neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus or CS), leading the neutral 
stimulus to elicit anxiety associated with the anticipation of the aversive stimulus 
(conditioned response or CR). In a fear conditioning account of PTSD, individuals with a 
vulnerability to developing this disorder (e.g., genetic predisposition, abnormalities in 
fear conditioning) who experience a sufficiently aversive event will show a fear 
conditioned response that is maladaptive  (e.g., excessively prolonged reactivity, 
generalization to benign stimuli).  
Symptoms of PTSD such as re-experiencing the event and avoidance of stimuli 
associated with the trauma are thought to be directly related to this fear conditioning 
process. There is a straightforward association between experiencing a traumatic event 
and subsequent excessive threat reactivity to trauma-relevant stimuli in PTSD patients 
which suggests that dysregulation of fear conditioning processes may be important in the 
development of psychopathology to trauma. Fear conditioning accounts of PTSD have 
focused on abnormalities in the acquisition, inhibition, extinction, associative learning, 
avoidance, or overgeneralization of conditioned fear (see Lissek & Grillon, 2012 for an 
overview). Overgeneralization refers to a propensity to generalize conditioned fear to 
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stimuli that resemble the original threat (Lissek et al., 2008; 2010). For example, a soldier 
who is conditioned to fear road side objects following an explosion while in a war zone 
may generalize that fear to benign road side objects upon returning home despite safety 
signals in the environment (familiar, non-war related surroundings) that should inhibit 
threat reactivity. A lower threshold for threat reactivity is thought to predispose the 
individual to overgeneralize fear to benign objects/situations that resemble the 
conditioned danger cue. In individuals with a lower threshold for threat reactivity, less 
threat information is needed to activate a fear response which will lead to reactivity to a 
larger range of stimuli resembling the danger cue; hence, the overgeneralization of fear.  
 Despite the importance of conditioned fear generalization in etiological accounts 
of PTSD, there is a paucity of research on the overgeneralization of conditioned fear in 
PTSD. The finding of overgeneralization of conditioned fear to stimuli that are 
perceptually similar to a conditioned danger cue is a robust finding in anxiety patients 
(Lissek et al., 2005). Studies have found enhanced fear responses to safety cues in PTSD 
patients using a discrimination learning paradigm (Grillon & Morgan, 1999; Jovanovic et 
al., 2010; Orr et al., 2000; Peri et al., 2000; for opposing results see Grillon et al., 1998; 
Morgan et al., 1995). Discrimination fear conditioning involves the presentation of a 
conditioned danger cue (CS+) that is paired with an aversive stimulus and a safety cue 
(CS-) that is not paired with an aversive stimulus. Because CS- typically shares similar 
features to the CS+ (both may be similar in size, shape, or spatial location), the finding of 
enhanced fear responses to CS- suggests that PTSD patients may be generalizing their 
fear to stimuli that resemble CS+.  
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 An experimental paradigm designed specifically to test the generalization of 
conditioned fear was developed by Lissek et al. (2008). The authors adapted the 
generalization paradigms used in animal studies and applied a similar experimental 
design to human research (for reviews of generalization paradigms, see Honig & 
Urcuioli, 1981; Kalish, 1969; Mackintosh, 1974). This paradigm involves the 
presentation of rings of graded size where the smallest and largest rings serve as either 
CS+ (paired with an electric shock) or CS- (no shock) and where eight rings of 
intermediate size serve as generalization stimuli that form a continuum-of-similarity 
between the danger and safety cue. Generalization is captured by the steepness of the 
downward gradient, or slope, in fear responding as the target stimulus differentiates from 
the danger cue, with less steep downward slopes indicating stronger generalization.  
Research using this paradigm has demonstrated that healthy participants show 
steep quadratic declines in fear responses to the generalization stimuli, suggesting 
relatively rapid declines in fear responding as the stimulus becomes less similar to CS+ 
(Lissek et al., 2008). Conversely, panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder patients 
demonstrated linear, more gradual declines in fear responses to the generalization stimuli, 
suggesting heightened fear responses to stimuli that resemble CS+ (Lissek et al., 2010, 
Lissek et al., under review). These results implicate overgeneralization of conditioned 
fear as an important correlate of clinical anxiety. Such overgeneralization may be 
particularly relevant to PTSD for which over-reactivity to stimuli resembling the 
traumatic event is a central feature; however, there are currently no published studies 
specifically aimed at assessing generalization of conditioned fear in PTSD patients.  
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Furthermore, little is known about the potential abnormalities in brain 
mechanisms associated with fear generalization in PTSD. Neural structures that are 
thought to be important for fear conditioning include the amygdala, the insula, the bed 
nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST), the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and 
the hippocampus (Davis & Shi, 1999; Jovanovic & Ressler, 2010; Kim & Fanselow, 
1992; Lissek et al., 2013; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992). Lissek et al. (2013) propose a neural 
model of conditioned fear generalization in which the sensory cortex and the 
hippocampus assist in pattern-matching between the encountered stimulus and previous 
learned conditioned danger cues. This sensory cortex/hippocampal processing network is 
thought to activate brain areas associated with fear excitation (e.g., amygdala, insula), in 
the instance of pattern matches, and fear inhibition (e.g., vmPFC), in the instance of 
pattern mismatches.  
Studies using fear conditioning paradigms support the finding of abnormalities in 
these brain areas in PTSD patients relative to controls, including increased activation of 
the amygdala and decreased activation in the anterior cingulate during extinction 
(Bremner et al., 2005), increased amygdala activation during extinction learning but 
decreased hippocampus and vmPFC activation during extinction recall (Milad et al., 
2009), and decreased vmPFC activation during threat of shock (Tuescher et al., 2011). 
Because the vmPFC is thought to inhibit activation of the limbic system, including the 
amygdala (Grace & Rosencrantz, 2002; Morgan, Romanski, & LeDoux, 1993; Phelps et 
al., 2004), the finding of excessive amygdala activation and decreased vmPFC activation 
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suggests that PTSD patients may be associated with deficits in both excitatory and 
inhibitory neural circuits.  
Research specific to the generalization of conditioned fear implicates a network of 
brain areas subserving conditioned fear generalization including bilateral insula, 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), bilateral inferior parietal lobule, striatum, 
thalamus, subgenual cingulate, anterior cingulate cortex, caudate nucleus, bilateral 
hippocampus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and precuneus (Dunsmoor et al., 
2011, 2012; Greenberg et al., 2013a, 2013b; Lissek et al., 2013). However, Dunsmoor 
and colleagues use an intensity-based generalization paradigm that involves both the 
perceptual similarity of the GSs to the CS+ and the emotional intensity of GSs (i.e., low, 
medium, or high levels of fearful facial expressions), making the two effects difficult to 
disentangle. Furthermore, Greenberg and colleagues employed an instructed threat 
generalization paradigm in which participants are informed that the GSs will never be 
paired with shock. Instructed threat involves higher-level cognitive reasoning, while the 
paradigm used by Lissek et al. (2013) is based on classical conditioning and may be more 
relevant to translational research between animals and humans. 
The generalization paradigm proposed by Lissek and colleagues provides an 
optimal method for testing classically conditioned fear generalization effects in PTSD 
that are not based on secondary emotional valence or highly cognitive instructed threat. 
Using this paradigm in healthy participants, Lissek et al. (2013) found activations in the 
insula, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, and bilateral inferior parietal lobule were strongest 
to the learned danger cue and decrease in a curve-linear manner as the presented stimulus 
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diverged in similarity from the danger cue. Inversely, activations in the hippocampus, 
vmPFC, and precuneus were strongest to the conditioned safety cue and decreased 
gradually as the presented stimulus becomes more similar to the conditioned danger cue 
(Lissek et al., 2013). However, there are currently no studies using this paradigm to 
explore group differences in the neural mechanisms subserving conditioned fear 
generalization in PTSD patients. 
The aim of the current study is to identify differences in the brain mechanisms 
associated with conditioned fear generalization between PTSD patients and controls. 
More specifically, this study aims to: 1) determine the degree to which veterans with 
PTSD generalize conditioned fear when compared to non-trauma controls, trauma 
controls, and individuals with sub-threshold PTSD, and 2) identify brain processes 
associated with the generalization of conditioned fear in PTSD. This study hypothesizes 
that veterans with PTSD will show stronger conditioned generalization than the control 
groups as evidenced by less steep, downward generalization slopes in behavioral indices 
of perceived threat, skin conductance responses, and fear-related brain areas (insula, 
dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala), as well as less steep upward slopes in brain 
areas associated with fear inhibition (ventral medial prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, 
precuneus).  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants included 79 male adults with a mean age of 33.46 (SD=9.62) who were 
recruited from the Minneapolis Veterans Affairs Medical Center, the University of 
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Minnesota, and local community colleges. All participant received reimbursement for 
their time. This study was approved by both the Minneapolis VA Institutional Review 
Board and the University of Minnesota Institutional Review Board and informed consent 
was obtained from all participants prior to testing. This study consisted of four groups: 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), sub-threshold PTSD, trauma controls, and non-
trauma controls (see table 3.1 for group demographics). The groups did not differ in 
terms education levels (p = .45) and group differences in age did not reach significance (p 
= .11). When age is entered as a covariate, the pattern of results remains the same. 
A diagnosis of PTSD was made using the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale for 
the DSM-IV (CAPS; Blake et al., 1990, Blake et al., 1995). A sub-threshold PTSD group 
was comprised of individuals with a trauma history but no current diagnosis of PTSD and 
a CAPS score between 20 and 39 based on the CAPS severity ratings suggested by 
Weathers, Keane, and Davidson (2001): 0-19 - asymptomatic/few symptoms, 20-39 - 
sub-threshold PTSD, 40-59 - Moderate PTSD/threshold, 60-79 - severe PTSD, ≥80 - 
Extreme PTSD. The trauma control group consisted of individuals with a history of 
trauma but no past or present diagnosis of PTSD. The non-trauma control group was 
comprised of individuals without trauma history. Exclusion criteria  included: 1) any 
medical condition, implant, or device that was not safe for the MRI environment; 2) 
current Axis I psychiatric disorder in the trauma controls or non-trauma controls as 
determined by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I; First et al., 2001); 
3) evidence of significant suicidal ideation or behavior; 4) individuals who currently (or 
during the last six months) met criteria for substance abuse or dependence; 5) any major 
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medical condition that interfered with the objectives of the study (e.g., history of organic 
mental disorders, seizure, or mental retardation); and 6) current use of illicit drugs. 
 
Table 3.1: Group demographics and symptoms questionnaires. 
 PTSD Sub-threshold 
PTSD 
Trauma 
Controls 
Non-trauma 
Controls 
Sample size  26 19 17 17 
Age in years  33.73 (9.12) 36.26 (9.58) 34.59 (9.27) 28.76 (9.91) 
CAPS 61.42* (16.20) 31.11* (7.73) 13.65* (6.77) 6.12* (6.86) 
PCL  54.12* (12.55) 43.37* (10.60) 33.12* (10.12) 27.00* (8.49) 
ASI  26.85* (13.37) 20.63 (11.26) 15.18* (7.54) 11.06* (7.00) 
State anxiety  47.62* (12.19) 41.42 (12.15) 32.18* (10.21) 31.00* (7.05) 
Trait anxiety  51.31* (10.35) 45.00 (12.82) 36.65* (11.19) 36.29* (6.82) 
BDI  18.81* (7.67) 12.95* (8.24) 9.24* (7.47) 5.35* (3.81) 
FPS  69.04 (20.25) 63.89 (14.74) 69.47 (19.80) 67.65 (18.82) 
Note. Group means and (standard deviations) are reported; Significant group differences 
(p < .05) are denoted with an asterisk. PTSD = Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; CAPS = 
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale; PCL = PTSD Checklist; ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity 
Index; BDI = the Beck Depression Inventory; FPS = Fear of Pain Scale. 
 
Generalization Task 
The generalization task is based on the generalization paradigm developed by 
Lissek et al. (2010) and has been modified to incorporate the design parameters of fMRI 
retinotopic mapping studies (e.g., Murray, Boyaci, & Kersten 2006; Schwartz, 2005). The 
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stimuli consisted of 5 checkerboard counterphase-flickering (10 Hz) rings of graded size 
and a checkerboard “V” (see Figure 3.1). Counter-phase flickering checkerboards were 
used to maximally activate the calcarine sulcus (Murray et al., 2006) in order to 
retinotopically map representations of CSs and GSs in sensory cortex (retinotopic data 
not reported in this paper).  
In the current paradigm, there was one ring-shaped danger cue (CS+) and two 
safety cues (CS-): one ring-shaped (referred to as the oCS-) and one “V” shaped (referred 
to as the vCS-). For half of participants, the smallest ring was designated CS+ and paired 
with an electric shock and the largest ring was oCS- and not paired with shock. For the 
other half of participants, the sizes of the CS+ and oCS- rings were reversed. The 
generalization stimuli consisted of three rings of intermediate size (i.e., GS1, GS2, GS3) 
that form a continuum of similarity between the largest and smallest rings. All subjects 
were also conditioned with the V” shaped safety cue (vCS-) in order to assess 
generalization to all circular stimuli. Participants may show a fear response to all ring 
sizes because they are similar in shape to the danger cue. Including vCS-, which is 
dissimilar in shape to the CS+ and generalization stimuli, allows us to compare brain 
activations between CS+ and a safety cue that is not influenced by possible generalization 
effects to all circular stimuli.  
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Design 
This study consisted of three phases: preacquisition, acquisition, and 
generalization. All CSs and GSs were presented for 4 s and were projected onto a screen 
which was reflected onto a mirror attached to the head coil. During inter-trial-intervals 
(ITIs), participants focused their gaze on crosshairs in the center of the screen. ITIs lasted 
for either 2.4 or 4.8 s. During the preacquisition phase, CS+, oCS-, vCS-, and the three 
classes of intermediate ring sizes (GS1, GS2, GS3) were presented 20 times each with no 
shock reinforcement (120 trials total). During the acquisition phase, CS+, oCS-, and vCS- 
were presented 20 times each (60 trials total) with 80% of the CS+ stimuli coterminating 
with an electric shock (100ms, 3-5μA), which was rated by participants as being ‘highly 
uncomfortable but not painful’. Shocks were administered to the participant’s right ankle 
Figure 3.1: Conditioning and generalization stimuli. Counterbalancing groups are 
designated by A and B (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped 
conditioned safety cue; GS1, GS2 and GS3 = 3 classes of generalization stimuli; CS+ = 
conditioned danger cue). Half of participants were assigned to counterbalancing group A 
and the other half to B. For both counterbalancing groups A and B, GS3 was the closest in 
size to CS+, with GS2 and GS1 becoming increasingly dissimilar to CS+. 
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using a constant current AC stimulator (Precision Instruments). During the generalization 
phase, each trial type (CS+, oCS-, vCS-, GS1, GS2, GS3) was presented 20 times (120 
trials total) with 50% of CS+ coterminating with electric shock.  
Behavioral Ratings 
Colored crosshairs (blue, yellow, red, green, purple) were presented serially for a 
duration of 800 ms each in a quasi-random order during stimuli presentation (CSs/GSs). 
Participants were instructed to continuously monitor the crosshairs and to rate their 
perceived level of risk for shock (1 = ‘no risk’, 2 = ‘moderate risk’, and 3 = ‘high risk’) 
as quickly as possible when a red crosshair appeared using a 3 button, fiber optic, 
response pad (Lumina LP-404 by Cedrus). Risk ratings and reaction times were recorded 
with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems). The red crosshair appeared on 
half of the trials. On reinforced CS+ trials, red-crosshairs never coterminated with shock 
to avoid shocks interfering with behavioral responses. Ratings of anxiety were also 
collected retrospectively following the pre-acquisition, acquisition, and generalization 
phases. Risk ratings and retrospective anxiety ratings were transformed into a measure of 
deviation from linearity (Mean(CS+ and CS-) - Mean (Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4)) in order to 
obtain a single continuous measure that characterizes the generalization slope which can 
be correlated with other continuous measures. 
Physiological Measurement and Analysis 
 Skin conductance responses (SCR) were collected using standard methods 
(Lykken & Venables, 1971). Skin conductance recording was completed using PsychLab 
software (Precision Instruments, Inc.). Two electrodes were attached to the bottom of the 
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participant’s left foot in order to keep the wires at a safe distance from the radio 
frequency field of the magnet. SCRs to the stimuli were required to have a latency onset 
of 1-5 s following stimulus onset. SCRs were calculated by subtracting the onset skin 
conductance level from the peak skin conductance level of the response wave. SCR data 
were square root transformed and range corrected to normalize data and to reduce the 
influence of between subjects variability unrelated to psychological processes (Lykken & 
Venables, 1971).  
fMRI Data Acquisition 
A 3T Siemens system equipped with a twelve-channel receive-only head coil was 
used to acquire functional T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPIs) depicting the BOLD 
contrast (TR: 2300 ms, TE: 23 ms, flip: 90°). Whole-brain acquisitions consisted of 36 
sagittally-oriented slices of 1.5 mm thickness and 1.5x1.5mm
2
 in-plane resolution 
(matrix: 128×128, FOV: 22 cm). A total of 1144 functional volumes were collected 
across 5 EPI runs with 235 volumes acquired for runs 1 and 2 (Pre-Acquisition), 170 for 
run 3 (Acquisition), and 249 and 255 for runs 4 and 5 (Generalization). Three high-
resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient-echo 
sequences (MP-RAGE) were obtained to serve as anatomical reference and to be used in 
retinotopic mapping (retinotopic data not reported in this paper). Head movement was 
limited with foam pads during data acquisition. 
Procedure 
Following informed consent and an MRI safety screening, participants completed 
a battery of questionnaires including the PTSD Checklist (PCL), the Anxiety Sensitivity 
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Index (ASI), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987), and 
Fear of Pain Scale (FPS). Next they were interviewed using the Clinician Administered 
PTSD Scale for the DSM-IV (CAPS; Blake et al., 1990, Blake et al., 1995) and the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I; First et al., 2001). Following the 
interview, shock electrodes were attached and participants were administered between 1-
3 sample shocks. Shock levels were adjusted based on the participant’s tolerance. Next, 
participants practiced the task without shocks before entering the scanner. Participants 
were told to pay attention to the presented stimuli and that they may be able to predict the 
shock. No information about the CS/US contingency was provided. Participants were 
then placed in the scanner. The order of the scans was as follows: first structural scan 
(MP-RAGE), preacquisition, acquisition, generalization, second MP-RAGE, and third 
MP-RAGE. Following the completion of each phase (preacquisiton, acquisition, and 
generalization), participants retrospectively rated their anxiety to CS+, oCS-, and vCS- on 
a scale from 0 to 10.  
fMRI Data Analysis 
Image analysis was completed using Analysis of Functional Neural Images 
(AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). Echo-planar time series data underwent slice-timing 
correction to adjust the amplitude of the signal acquired from each slice to account for the 
order of slice acquisition within each volume, motion correction (registration to the 
seventh volume of the first functional imaging scan), spatial smoothing to minimize the 
effects of anatomical variability (FWHM= 2.5 mm), and normalization to percent signal 
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change using as a baseline each subject’s voxel-wise time-series mean. Data from 
separate runs for the same task were concatenated. Subjects with more than 3.0 mm of 
head motion in any dimension from one EPI brain volume to the next were removed. One 
participant was excluded from analyses for an abnormal scan. 
For the pre-acquisition and generalization phases separately, individual analyses 
involved computing functional maps by regressing each voxel’s fMRI response time-
course onto an ideal response function (Gamma-variate function convolved with the 
time-series of each of 6 stimulus types: vCS-, oCS-, GS1, GS2, GS3, unreinforced CS+). 
Baseline drift, motion parameters, response time course (button presses), time course of 
task instructions, and time course of CS+ paired with shock (during generalization only) 
were modeled as covariates of no interest. The acquisition phase was used to condition 
participants to CS+, oCS-, and vCS- and was not intended for analyses due to the 
majority of CS+ trials being contaminated with US administrations. Furthermore, the 
acquisition data were not critical for testing the generalization hypotheses of interest. 
For the generalization-phase data, group-level analyses involved two stages: 1) 
identification of functional regions of interest (fROI) and 2) averaging beta weights 
across voxels within these functional ROIs to plot across conditioned and generalization 
stimuli between groups to analyze group differences in generalization. During stage 1, 
whole brain analyses were conducted for the CS+ (unreinforced) vs. vCS- contrast using 
a voxelwise probability of p ≤ .00003 and a cluster probability of p ≤ .05. A stringent 
voxelwise probability was necessary to achieve adequate demarcation between clusters. 
The AFNI program, 3dClustSim, was used to determine the minimum number of voxels 
  60 
that define a cluster using the voxelwise and clusterwise p-values mentioned above. The 
CS+ (unreinforced) vs. vCS- contrast was chosen over the CS+ (unreinforced) vs. oCS- 
contrast because the latter contrast is influenced by the possible generalization of fear to 
all circular stimuli. However, the pattern of generalization results does not change 
significantly when analyzing the CS+ (unreinforced) vs. oCS- contrast.  
 During stage 2 of the group-level analyses, average beta weights for functional 
ROIs were plotted for the conditioned and generalization stimuli separately for each 
group. Analysis of generalization effects utilized 4x6 repeated measures ANOVAs (four 
groups: PTSD, sub-threshold PTSD, trauma control, non-trauma control by six stimuli: 
vCS, oCS-, GS1, GS2, GS3, unreinforced CS+). ANOVAs were computed using Wilks’s 
lambda and were followed, when necessary, by quadratic and linear trend analyses and/or 
paired-samples t tests. Criterion alpha for ANOVAs and follow up statistics was set at p 
= .05. Geisser-Greenhouse corrections were used when there were violations of the 
sphericity assumption.  
Functional Connectivity Analysis 
 Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) was used to estimate the connectivity 
between brain regions in relation to the generalization task (Friston et al., 1997). 
Functionally defined seed regions included the hippocampus, right and left insula, 
vmPFC, and dmPFC based on a priori predictions regarding the fear-conditioning neural 
network (see Lissek et al., 2013). We would predict increased neural connectivity 
between the hippocampus and brain areas associated with fear excitation (e.g., insula) 
when comparing stimuli with more versus less resemblance to CS+ and increased neural 
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connectivity between the hippocampus and brain areas associated with fear inhibition 
(e.g., vmPFC) when comparing stimuli with less versus more resemblance to CS+. The 
criterion alpha was set at p ≤ 0.001 based on previous research employing PPI analyses 
(Passamonti et al., 2009).  
Results 
Subjective Ratings and Reaction Times 
 Pre-acquisition. No differences were found between CS+ and oCS- for 
retrospective ratings of anxiety (p = .36) or online behavioral ratings of perceived risk for 
shock (p = .44) prior to conditioning. In addition, there were no differences between CS+ 
and vCS- for online behavioral ratings of perceived risk for shock (p = .33) during pre-
acquisition. However, retrospective ratings of anxiety were higher for vCS- than CS+ 
prior to conditioning (vCS- M=2.75, SD=2.87; CS+ M=1.89, SD=2.32; t(78)= 3.05, p = 
.003). In addition, a main effect for group was apparent for retrospective anxiety ratings 
(F(3,75)= 3.41, p = .022). Further analyses revealed higher retrospective ratings of 
anxiety to vCS- than CS+ in the non-trauma control group (p = .029) and in the PTSD 
group, although this did not reach significance (p = .061). The trauma control and sub-
threshold PTSD groups did not differ in retrospective ratings of anxiety between vCS- 
and CS+ (p-values ≥ .19). The conditioned and generalization stimuli did not differ in 
online risk ratings regardless of whether the vCS- is included or excluded (p-values ≥ 
.22) and there were no group differences in online risk ratings for any of the stimuli (p ≥ 
.33). No differences in reaction times were found for any of the stimuli during pre-
acquisition (p-values ≥ .13). 
  62 
 Acquisition. Following conditioning, online ratings of risk were greater to CS+ 
(M=1.40, SD=.55) than to oCS- (M=.40, SD=.53) or vCS- (M=.36, SD=.50), p-values < 
.0001, suggesting that the participants successfully acquired conditioned fear to the 
danger cue. In addition, retrospective ratings of anxiety were greater for CS+ (M=6.43, 
SD=2.69) compared to both oCS- (M=1.75, SD=2.26) and vCS- (M=1.76, SD=2.40), p-
values < .0001. Online risk ratings and retrospective anxiety ratings did not differ 
between oCS- and vCS- (p-values ≥ .39). Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show retrospective anxiety 
ratings and risk ratings as a function of stimulus type and group. No main effects for 
group or group by stimulus interactions were found for online risk ratings or retrospective 
anxiety (p-values ≥ .21); however, a group by stimulus type interaction was found for 
reaction times (F(6,148)=2.86, p = .012). The non-trauma control group showed faster 
reaction times to oCS- (M=5309.21, SD=743.86) than vCS- (M=6126.97, SD=1306.27; p 
= .007) or CS+ (M=6204.18, SD=1245.82; p = .005). The sub-threshold PTSD group 
showed a trend toward faster reaction times to oCS- (M=5966.47, SD=1198.36) 
compared to CS+ (M=6626.83, SD=2045.98; p = .058). No other group differences in 
reaction times were significant (p-values ≥ .28).  
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Figure 3.2: Retrospective anxiety ratings (scale of 0-10) following the acquisition phase as 
a function of stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped 
conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group (NTC = non-trauma 
controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = PTSD patients).  
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 Generalization. Online risk ratings and retrospective anxiety continued to be greater 
to CS+ versus both oCS- and vCS- (all p-values < .0001), suggesting that conditioned 
fear persisted during the generalization sequence. No group differences in online risk 
ratings and retrospective anxiety to CS+ versus both oCS- and vCS- were apparent (p-
values ≥ .39). A 4x6 (group by stimulus type) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for stimulus type for the online risk ratings (F(5,71)=40.45, p < 
Figure 3.3: Risk ratings (0 = no risk, 1 = some risk, 2 = a lot of risk) during the acquisition 
phase as a function of stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-
shaped conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group (NTC = non-
trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = PTSD 
patients).  
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.0001). Levels of reported risk increased from vCS- to oCS- to GS1, to GS2, to GS3 to CS+ 
(see Figures 3.4a-d), suggesting generalization of conditioned fear as the stimulus 
becomes more similar to CS+. No main effect for group or group by stimulus interaction 
was found for online risk ratings (p-values ≥ .28). All groups showed generalization 
gradients consisting of both linear (p-values < .0001) and quadratic components (non-
trauma controls: p < .001; trauma controls: p < .001; sub-threshold PTSD group: p = 
.001; PTSD group: p = .008).  
 Planned contrasts corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni’s method 
(criterion p = .003) showed significantly elevated levels of risk to GS3 and CS+ relative 
to vCS- in the non-trauma and trauma control groups (p-values < .001; denoted with a 
black marker in Figures 3.4a-d). The sub-threshold PTSD and PTSD groups showed 
significantly elevated levels of risk to GS2, GS3, and CS+ relative to vCS- (p-values ≤ 
.001), suggesting generalization of perceived risk to a greater range of stimuli in these 
groups. For the reaction times, a significant main effect for stimulus type was found (p < 
.0001). Reaction times were characterized by an inverted U shape with slower reaction 
times to the generalization stimuli (see Figure 3.5), consistent with previous research 
showing slower responding for stimuli with less certain threat information than the 
conditioned danger and safety cues (Lissek et al., 2010). No group by stimulus type 
interaction or main effect of group was found for reaction times (p-values ≥ .40).  
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Figure 3.4a-d: Risk ratings (0 = no risk, 1 = some risk, 2 = a lot of risk) for each group 
during the generalization phase as a function of stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped 
conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned safety cue;  GS1, GS2, GS3 = 
generalization stimuli; CS+ = conditioned danger cue). Dotted lines reflecting linear 
decreases in risk from CS+ to vCS- are included to illustrate each gradient’s deviation 
from linearity. Black dots indicate a significant difference in risk ratings when compared 
to vCS-. 
 
a) b) 
c) d) 
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Skin Conductance 
Pre-acquisition. During pre-acquisition, no main effect for stimulus type, main 
effect for group, or stimulus type by group interaction was found, suggesting no 
differences in skin conductance prior to conditioning.  
Figure 3.5: Reaction times (msec) during the generalization phase as a function of 
stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned 
safety cue;  GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli; CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and 
group (NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD 
group, P = PTSD patients).  
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 Acquisition. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
stimulus type (F(2,73)=7.90, p = .001). Greater skin conductance responses were found 
to CS+ (M=.64, SD=.38) than to oCS- (M=.44, SD=.32) or vCS- (M=.46, SD=.30) p-
values ≤ .001 (see Figure 3.6), further suggesting the successful acquisition of 
conditioned fear following conditioning. No main effect for group or group by stimulus 
type interaction was found (p-values ≥ .16; see Figure 3.7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Skin conductance responses (SCR) during the acquisition phase for each 
stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned 
safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue). 
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 Generalization. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
stimulus type (F(5,68)=13.56, p < .001). Figure 3.8 shows the skin conductance gradients 
where skin conductance responses were greatest to CS+ and smaller for the other stimuli, 
suggesting that conditioned fear persisted during generalization. No main effect for group 
or group by stimulus interaction was found (p-values ≥ .46). Gradients were characterized 
by linear slopes in the trauma controls, sub-threshold PTSD group, and PTSD group (p-
values ≤ .046) and cubic components in the non-trauma controls, trauma controls, and 
Figure 3.7: Skin conductance responses (SCR) during the acquisition phase as a function 
of stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned 
safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group (NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = 
trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = PTSD patients).  
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PTSD group (p-values ≤ .037). There was a trend toward a quadratic slope in the non-
trauma controls (p = .085), but no other groups showed quadratic components (p-values ≥ 
.20).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fMRI Activations  
 Functional regions of interest (fROI’s). Table 3.2 lists the brain regions that were 
differentially activated to CS+ versus vCS- and that survived a voxelwise probability of 
Figure 3.8: Skin conductance responses (SCR) during the generalization phase as a 
function of stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped 
conditioned safety cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli; CS+ = conditioned 
danger cue) and group (NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-
threshold PTSD group, P = PTSD patients).  
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 and a cluster probability of .05. Using these brain areas as functional ROI’s, 
percent signal change was measured for each stimulus type (vCS-, oCS-, G1, G2, G3, 
CS+) and generalization gradients were compared before and after acquisition training. 
 Pre-acquisition. Prior to conditioning, these fROI’s did not show linear or quadratic 
increases in BOLD signal as the presented stimulus increased in similarity to the CS+. 
 Generalization test. Following acquisition, 4x6 (group by stimuli) repeated 
measures ANOVAs revealed significant group by stimulus type interactions in the right 
insula (F(15,193.64)=2.45, p = .003), left insula (F(15,193.64)=1.77, p = .042), dmPFC 
(F(15,193.64)=2.62, p = .001), right precentral gyrus (BA9: F(15,193.64)=2.41, p = 
.003), and left inferior parietal lobule (F(15,193.64)=1.94, p = .022). Furthermore, tests 
of within subjects effects revealed significant group by stimulus type interactions in the 
left caudate nucleus (F(11.81,291.30)=1.96, p = .029), right caudate nucleus 
(F(10.78,265.91)=1.94, p = .036), left thalamus (F(12.93,318.86)=1.79, p = .044), right 
thalamus (F(12.33,304.13)=1.80, p = .046), and right superior frontal gyrus (BA 10; 
F(15,370)=1.87, p = .025). Specifically, these areas were associated with generalization 
gradients characterized by positive slopes in BOLD activations (responses strongest to 
CS+ with degraded reactivity to GS3, GS2, GS1, oCS-, and vCS-).  
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Table 3.2  
Brain areas responding differentially to CS+ versus vCS- that served as functional 
regions of interest (fROIs). 
Brain Region  Direction 
 Peak Coordinates*  
Volume 
(μl) 
X Y Z ß 
dmPFC (BA6) CS+ > vCS- 10438.88 -1.5 -16.5 35.5 0.29 
R insula CS+ > vCS- 7074 -52.5 -16.5 1.0 0.34 
L insula CS+ > vCS- 5936.63 48.0 -16.5 -.05 0.30 
R PreCG 
(BA9) 
CS+ > vCS- 3918.38 -45.0 -6.0 34.0 0.25 
R caudate CS+ > vCS- 1434.38 -7.5 -3.0 8.5 0.34 
L caudate CS+ > vCS- 1589.63 6.0 -4.5 7.0 0.34 
R thalamus CS+ > vCS- 1586.25 -1.5 21.0 1.0 0.29 
L thalamus CS+ > vCS- 833.63 6.0 16.5 11.5 0.26 
R LG (BA18) CS+ > vCS- 803.25 -13.5 82.5 -9.5 0.45 
L LG (BA18) CS+ > vCS- 941.63 13.5 84.0 -12.5 0.41 
R SFG (BA10) CS+ > vCS- 651.38 -34.5 -51.0 23.5 0.19 
R IPL CS+ > vCS- 567 -61.5 42.0 22.0 0.20 
L IPL CS+ > vCS- 256.5 61.5 24.0 23.5 0.24 
       
vmPFC 
(BA10) 
vCS- > CS+ 4053.38 6.0 -31.5 -8.0 0.31 
PCu vCS- > CS+ 1701 1.5 51.0 17.5 0.22 
R hippocampus vCS- > CS+ 135 -22.5 16.5 -11.0 0.35 
L hippocampus vCS- > CS+ 114.75 21.0 16.5 -9.5 0.35 
R MTG vCS- > CS+ 236.25 -48.0 66.0 23.5 0.19 
L MTG vCS- > CS+ 1761.75 42.0 72.0 34.0 0.22 
R ITG (BA19) vCS- > CS+ 722.25 -54.0 64.5 -0.5 0.27 
L SFG (BA 9) vCS- > CS+ 280.13 9.0 -60.0 29.5 0.20 
R CG vCS- > CS+ 236.25 -18.0 -6.0 25.0 0.24 
        
Note. ß = mean beta weight; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; vCS- = v-shaped conditioned 
safety cue; L = left; R = right; BA = Brodmann Area; dmPFC = dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex; PreCG = precentral gyrus; LG = lingual gyrus; SFG = superior frontal gyrus; IPL 
= inferior parietal lobule; vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; PCu = precuneus; 
MTG = middle temporal gyrus; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus; CG = cingulate gyrus. 
*Peak coordinates are in RAI format. 
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 Tests of linear and quadratic trends were used to examine for group differences in 
the steepness of the generalization gradient slopes. Analyses revealed that non-trauma 
controls, trauma controls, and the sub-threshold PTSD group were associated with both 
linear and quadratic trends in dmPFC, bilateral insula, and right caudate nucleus (p-
values ≤ .023), indicating that as the stimulus differs from the danger cue, there is a steep 
drop in BOLD activation (see Figures 3.9-3.12). Conversely, the PTSD group’s 
generalization gradients were associated with linear trends (p-values ≤ .0001) but no 
significant quadratic trends (p-values ≥ .082) in these areas, suggesting a less precipitous 
decline in BOLD activation as the stimulus decreases in similarity to CS+ (greater 
generalization). The left caudate nucleus was associated with linear and quadratic trends 
in the non-trauma controls and trauma controls (p-values ≤ .008) compared to the sub-
threshold PTSD and PTSD groups, which showed linear trends (p-values ≤ .002) but no 
quadratic trends (p-values ≥ .19; see Figure 3.13). Additional positive gradients were 
found in the right precentral gyrus (BA9), left and right thalamus, left inferior parietal 
lobule, and right superior frontal gyrus (BA 10), which were associated with linear trends 
for all groups (p-values ≤ .037) and quadratic trends only in the trauma controls (p-values 
≤ .026). 
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Figure 3.9a 
Figure 3.9b 
Figure 3.9: a) Percent BOLD signal change in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex as a 
function of stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped 
conditioned safety cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned 
danger cue) and group (NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-
threshold PTSD group, P = PTSD patients); b) activation in the dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex (peak voxel denoted with crosshairs). 
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Figure 3.10: a) Percent BOLD signal change in the right insula as a function of stimulus 
type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned safety 
cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group 
(NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = 
PTSD patients); b) activation in the right insula (peak voxel denoted with crosshairs). 
Figure 3.10a 
Figure 3.10b 
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Figure 3.11: a) Percent BOLD signal change in the left insula as a function of stimulus 
type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned safety 
cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group 
(NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = 
PTSD patients); b) activation in the left insula (peak voxel denoted with crosshairs). 
Figure 3.11a 
Figure 3.11b 
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Figure 3.12: a) Percent BOLD signal change in the right caudate as a function of stimulus 
type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned safety 
cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group 
(NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = 
PTSD patients); b) activation in the right caudate (peak voxel denoted with crosshairs). 
Figure 3.12a 
Figure 3.12b 
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Figure 3.13: a) Percent BOLD signal change in the left caudate as a function of stimulus 
type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned safety 
cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group 
(NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = 
PTSD patients); b) activation in the left caudate (peak voxel denoted with crosshairs). 
Figure 3.13b 
Figure 3.13a 
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 No group differences were found in the other regions listed in table 3.2 but the 
following fROIs were also associated with positive generalization gradient slopes: right 
lingual gyrus (BA18), left lingual gyrus (BA18), and right inferior parietal lobule (linear: 
p-values ≤ .0001, quadratic: p-values ≤ .0001). Areas associated with negative 
generalization gradients (responses strongest to vCS- with degraded reactivity to oCS-, 
GS1, GS2, GS3. and CS+) but no group differences included: ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (linear: p < .0001; quadratic: p = .028), left hippocampus (linear: p < .0001; 
quadratic: p = .005), right hippocampus (linear: p < .0001; quadratic: p = ns), and 
precuneus (linear: p < .0001; quadratic: p = ns), see Figures 3.14-3.17. No group 
differences were apparent in any of these areas when comparing the PTSD group to non-
trauma controls only (p-values ≥ .28) or to trauma controls only (p-values ≥ .31). 
Additional areas associated with negative generalization gradients included left and right 
middle temporal gyrus (linear: p-values < .0001; quadratic: p-values = ns), right inferior 
temporal gyrus (linear: p < .0001; quadratic: p = .002), left superior frontal gyrus (linear: 
p ≤ .0001, quadratic: p = ns), and right cingulate gyrus (linear: p < .0001; quadratic: p = 
.001).  
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Figure 3.14a 
Figure 3.14: a) Percent BOLD signal change in vmPFC as a function of stimulus type 
(vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned safety cue; 
GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group (NTC 
= non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = PTSD 
patients); b) activation in vmPFC (peak voxel denoted with crosshairs). 
Figure 3.14b 
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Figure 3.15: a) Percent BOLD signal change in right hippocampus as a function of 
stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned 
safety cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and 
group (NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD 
group, P = PTSD patients); b) activation in right hippocampus (peak voxel denoted with 
crosshairs). 
Figure 3.15a 
Figure 3.15b 
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Figure 3.16: a) Percent BOLD signal change in left hippocampus as a function of 
stimulus type (vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned 
safety cue; GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and 
group (NTC = non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD 
group, P = PTSD patients); b) activation in left hippocampus (peak voxel denoted with 
crosshairs). 
Figure 3.16a 
Figure 3.16b 
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Figure 3.17: a) Percent BOLD signal change in precuneus as a function of stimulus type 
(vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; oCS- = ring-shaped conditioned safety cue; 
GS1, GS2, GS3 = generalization stimuli, CS+ = conditioned danger cue) and group (NTC 
= non-trauma controls, TC = trauma controls, SP = sub-threshold PTSD group, P = PTSD 
patients); b) activation in precuneus (peak voxel denoted with crosshairs). 
Figure 3.17a 
Figure 3.17b 
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Brain-Behavior Correlations 
 Conditioned fear. Online ratings of perceived shock risk and retrospective anxiety 
ratings were correlated with the average activations in each of the fROIs. Risk ratings to 
CS+ versus vCS- were positively correlated with CS+ minus vCS- BOLD activations in 
the right insula (r(76)= .32, p = .004), left insula (r(76)= .26, p = .020), and right caudate 
(r(76)= .24, p = .032), and negatively correlated with the vmPFC (r(76)= -.37, p = .001) 
and precuneus (r(76)= -.28, p = .014). Retrospective anxiety ratings to CS+ versus vCS- 
were positively correlated with activations in the dmPFC (r(76)= .24, p = .036), right 
insula (r(76)= .28, p = .012), left insula (r(76)= .33, p = .003), right precentral gyrus 
(r(76)= .28, p = .012), right thalamus (r(76)= .26, p = .023), and left thalamus (r(76)= 
.28, p = .013), and negatively correlated with the vmPFC (r(76)= -.34, p = .003), left 
middle temporal gyrus (r(76)= -.23, p = .046), and precuneus (r(76)= -.25, p = .029). No 
other fROI correlations were significant. 
 Generalization. Brain-behavior relations for conditioned generalization were tested 
using a measure of deviation from linearity calculated for risk ratings and BOLD 
activations as (Mean(CS+ and vCS-) - Mean (GS1, GS2, and GS3)) in order to obtain a 
single continuous measure that characterizes the shape of the generalization slope. Using 
this measure, risk ratings were positively correlated with left insula (r(76)= .23, p = .043), 
left inferior parietal lobule (r(76)= .24, p = .035), and there was a positive trend in left 
thalamus (r(76)= .20, p = .073). No other fROI correlations were significant (p-values ≥ 
.12). Risk ratings were not significantly correlated with CAPS scores or other indices of 
symptom severity (p-values ≥ .24). 
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Connectivity Results 
 Results from PPI analyses are listed in table 3.3. Left and right hippocampus served 
as seeds for PPI analyses based on importance of the hippocampus in the neural model of 
generalization proposed by Lissek and colleagues (2013). With the right hippocampus as 
the seed, functional coupling with the left inferior parietal lobule, right anterior cingulate, 
left thalamus, and dmPFC were stronger during CS+ versus vCS- (p-values < .05, 
uncorrected). Using the left hippocampus as the seed, greater functional coupling to CS+ 
versus vCS- was found in bilateral insula and right thalamus (p-values < .05, 
uncorrected). Greater functional coupling to vCS- versus CS+ was found between the left 
hippocampus and the right precuneus and vmPFC (p-values < .05, uncorrected).  
 
Table 3.3 
Results from psychophysiological interaction analyses 
 
Seed  
Region  
Target 
Region 
 Peak Coordinates*  
Effect X Y Z t-value 
R Hippocampus  IPL CS+ > vCS- 45.0 42.0 38.5 4.06 
 R ACC CS+ > vCS- -9.0 -21.0 25.0 3.81 
 L Thal CS+ > vCS- 18.0 12.0 10.0 5.09 
 dmPFC CS+ > vCS- -7.5 -42.0 25.0 4.10 
L Hippocampus R PCu vCS- > CS+ -27.0 72.0 25.0 4.21 
 R Thal CS+ > vCS- -9.0 31.5 10.0 7.05 
 vmPFC vCS- > CS+ -6.0 -46.5 -11.0 6.69 
 R 
insula 
CS+ > vCS- -33.0 -9.0 -3.5 4.91 
 L CS+ > vCS- 27.0 28.5 20.5 4.85 
        
Note. vCS- = v-shaped conditioned safety cue; CS+ = conditioned danger cue; L = left; R 
= right; IPL = inferior parietal lobule; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; Thal = thalamus; 
dmPFC = dorsal medial prefrontal cortex; PCu = precuneus; vmPFC = ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex. All effects were significant at p ≤ .05, uncorrected. *Peak coordinates 
are in RAI format. 
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Discussion 
 This study found that PTSD patients showed evidence of overgeneralization of 
conditioned fear in bilateral insula, dmPFC, and right and left caudate. Specifically, 
PTSD patients showed less steep, linear declines in BOLD activation as the presented 
stimulus becomes less similar to CS+, suggesting heightened activation of fear-related 
brain areas to stimuli that approximate the conditioned danger cue. Consistent with 
previous research in healthy participants (Lissek et al., 2013), non-trauma controls, 
trauma controls, and the sub-threshold PTSD group showed steep, quadratic declines in 
BOLD activations in bilateral insula, dmPFC, and right and left caudate, suggesting a 
rapid decline in activation of fear-related brain areas as the stimulus diverged in 
similarity to CS+. Also consistent with Lissek et al., (2013), the current study found that 
bilateral hippocampus, vmPFC, and precuneus showed the greatest activation to the CS- 
in all participants, which then decreased gradually with increasing similarity to the 
conditioned danger cue. No group differences were apparent in these brain regions in the 
current study.  
 Behavioral results also showed declines in risk ratings as the stimulus becomes 
less similar to CS+, consistent with previous work (Lissek et al., 2010; Lissek et al., 
2013). Additionally, PTSD patients and the sub-threshold PTSD group generalized 
perceived risk to rings with two degrees of differentiation from CS+ (GS2 and GS3) while 
the trauma and non-trauma controls only generalized to rings with one degree of 
differentiation (GS3), suggesting overgeneralization in the PTSD and sub-threshold PTSD 
groups. Skin conductance results also showed declines in skin conductance as the 
  87 
stimulus decreases in similarity to CS+, although the gradients were similar across 
groups. 
 Evaluation of a neurobiological model of conditioned fear generalization. The 
results of this study support the neurobiological model of conditioned fear generalization 
proposed by Lissek and collegues (Lissek et al., 2013). According to this model, the 
sensory cortex and the hippocampus assist in pattern-matching between the encountered 
stimulus and previous learned conditioned danger cues and this information is then 
relayed to brain areas associated with fear excitation (e.g., insula) and fear inhibition 
(e.g., vmPFC). Animal research implicates the hippocampus in generalization of fear 
conditioning, with lesions of the hippocampus or its cortical inputs leading to greater fear 
generalization in animals (Bucci et al., 2002; Solomon & Moore, 1975; Wild & 
Blampied, 1972). The hippocampus is also implicated in schematic matching which is 
necessary for discrimination of CS+ from CS- (O'Reilly & Rudy, 2001; Otto & 
Eichenbaum, 1992; Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005).  
Likewise, the sensory regions of the brain are proposed to contribute to 
conditioned generalization by processing stimulus features of CS+ and GSs, which is 
supported by increased generalization of conditioned fear following lesions of the 
sensory cortex and thalamus in animals (Antunes & Moita, 2010; Jarrell et al., 1987; 
Teich et al., 1988; for opposing results see Armony et al., 1997). The results of the 
current study support the importance of the hippocampus and sensory regions including 
the thalamus in schematic matching, as evidenced by decreases in activation in these 
areas as the stimulus becomes more similar to the danger cue. However, we did not find 
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evidence of group differences in hippocampal or sensory region activation, suggesting 
that PTSD patients did not experience deficits in pattern separation in this study.  
Fear-related brain regions. Fear-related brain areas that are proposed to be 
mediated by the hippocampus and sensory regions include the insula, dmPFC, and 
amygdala. Activation of bilateral insula to CS+ in the current study is consistent with 
previous work showing the importance of the insula in anticipatory processing, fear 
conditioning, and salience appraisal (Lissek et al., 2013; Lovero et al., 2009; Menon and 
Uddin, 2010; Nitschke, Sarinopoulos, Mackiewicz, Schaefer, & Davidson, 2006; Paulus 
& Stein, 2006). The insula is thought to integrate threat information and transmits it to 
brain areas responsible for attentional control, physiological arousal, and motor 
responding. The current study was able to demonstrate less steep, linear declines in 
BOLD activation as the presented stimulus becomes less similar to CS+ in PTSD patients 
compared to quadratic declines in controls, suggesting that overgeneralization of 
conditioned fear is a neurobiological marker of psychopathology to trauma.  
Another region implicated during fear excitation is the dmPFC. Animal studies 
demonstrate that lesions of the dmPFC result in greater generalization of conditioned fear 
to contextual stimuli in rats (Morgan & LeDoux, 1995). Furthermore, the dmPFC has 
been implicated in the appraisal and expression of negative emotion (Etkin, Egner, & 
Kalisch, 2011) and in fear conditioning responses (Lissek et al., 2013). The current study 
found declines in BOLD activation as the presented stimulus becomes less similar to 
CS+, consistent with previous research (Lissek et al., 2013). Additionally, PTSD patients 
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showed less steep, linear declines in the dmPFC, suggesting greater generalization in this 
group. 
Conversely, this study was unable to find differences in amygdala activation for 
the CS+ vs. vCS- contrast using the current paradigm. The amygdala is associated with 
fear acquisition and expression (Davis, 1992; LeDoux, 2000). Previous work using fear 
conditioning paradigms suggests that amygdala responses habituate with increasing 
number of trials (Büchel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998); however, even when 
restricting analyses to the first half of the generalization trials, there was still no 
differential amygdala activation to CS+ vs. vCS- in this study. Others have also reported 
a lack of amygdala activation between CS+ and GS or CS-comparisons (Greenberg et al., 
2013; Lissek et al., 2013). Greenberg et al. (2013) noted that the similar levels of 
amygdala activation to CS+ and GSs may be due to the similarity between CS+ and GSs 
or may represent engagement of the amygdala to all stimuli while the relationship 
between the stimulus and shock is learned. The current study employed a safety cue that 
was dissimilar in shape to the danger cue; therefore, the absence of a differential response 
in the amygdala cannot be explained by similarity between CS+ and vCS-. However, 
because CS+, oCS-, and vCS- were presented together during the acquisition phase, it is 
possible that there is amygdala engagement to all stimuli that were presented during 
conditioning.  
Brain areas associated with prediction of appetitive/aversive stimuli. This study 
was able to demonstrate activation of the left and right caudate to CS+ versus vCS-, 
consistent with the work by Greenberg and colleagues. Activation of the dorsal striatum 
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(consisting of the caudate and putamen) has been found to be associated with reward 
prediction (for a review, see O’Doherty, 2004) as well as prediction of negative 
outcomes, such as shock or monetary loss (for a review, see Delgado, Li, Schiller, & 
Phelps, 2008). In animal research, lesions to the dorsal striatum have been shown to lead 
to abnormalities in conditioned freezing, conditioned emotional responses, and passive 
and active avoidance (e.g., Winocur, 1974; Prado-Alcala et al., 1975; Viaud & White, 
1989; White & Salinas, 2003; for an overview, see Delgado et al., 2008). Activation of 
the striatum has also been shown in humans during fear conditioning (Büchel, Dolan, 
Armony, & Friston, 1999; LaBar et al. 1998; Phelps et al. 2004; Schiller et al., 2008) and 
during an instructed threat generalization paradigm (Greenberg et al., 2013a; 2013b). In 
particular, activations of the striatum and especially the caudate have been shown to be 
correlated with prediction error (PE) signals, which arise when an outcome deviates from 
expectation (Delgado et al., 2008). Greenberg et al. (2013a) note that we would expect to 
see a gradual decline in PE signals and associated caudate activation during 
generalization because the expectation of receiving a shock decreases as the stimulus 
becomes less similar to CS+. 
Regions associated with fear inhibition. In addition to fear related brain areas, 
information from the sensory regions and hippocampus is also proposed to be relayed to 
regions associated with the inhibition of fear such as the ventral medial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC; Lissek et al., 2013). The vmPFC is implicated in the inhibition of fear 
responses. Animal studies show that lesions in the vmPFC lead to the generalization of 
conditioned fear in rats to unpaired contexts and contextual stimuli (Morgan & LeDoux, 
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1995; Zelinski et al., 2010). The importance of the vmPFC in fear inhibition is further 
supported by research in humans showing activation of the vmPFC to conditioned stimuli 
following extinction training (Milad et al., 2007; Phelps et al., 2004; Schiller et al., 2008). 
As predicted by the neurobiological model of generalization proposed by Lissek and 
colleagues, the results of this study showed the greatest activation to the CS- in vmPFC, 
which then decreased gradually with increasing similarity to CS+. However, the current 
study did not find group differences in activation of the vmPFC. 
Inhibitory vs. excitatory fear conditioning accounts of PTSD. Two processes that 
have been proposed to lead to enhanced fear responding in PTSD patients during fear 
conditioning include deficits in inhibition and excessive excitation of fear-related 
networks. Davis and colleagues (2000) and Jovanovic and Ressler (2010) proposed that 
the impaired ability to inhibit a conditioned fear response leads to enhanced fear 
responding to safety cues. Conversely, excitation accounts of fear conditioning posit that 
enhanced fear responses are the result of excessive excitation of fear-related networks 
which leads to overgeneralization of conditioned fear (Lissek & Grillon, 2012).  
Functional imaging methods can be used to dissociate excitatory and inhibitory 
processes by examining whether abnormalities in conditioned fear are associated with 
abnormalities in excitatory brain mechanisms (e.g., insula) or inhibitory ones (e.g., 
vmPFC). The results of the current study demonstrated enhanced fear responding to 
stimuli that approximate the conditioned danger cue in PTSD patients compared to 
controls in bilateral insula and dmPFC but no group differences were found in vmPFC. 
Enhanced fear responding in this experimental paradigm thus seems to have been due to 
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excessive excitation rather than impaired inhibition, suggesting that PTSD is associated 
with abnormalities in excitatory neural networks. However, symptoms of PTSD are likely 
due to a complex interaction between excitatory and inhibitory processes and further 
imaging research is needed using fear inhibition paradigms. 
 Limitations and future directions. A limitation of the current study includes the 
use of males with primarily combat-related trauma, which was the result of recruitment 
through a Veteran’s Affairs Medical Center. The results of this study require replication 
in females and those with diverse trauma experiences such as sexual or physical assaults, 
accidents, or natural disasters. An additional limitation includes the insufficient number 
of unreinforced CS+ trials during the acquisition phase, which did not allow for analysis 
of group differences during acquisition training. Future studies on conditioned fear 
generalization in PTSD could focus on whether generalization differs based on the type 
of trauma experienced or whether time since the trauma has an effect as we might expect 
overgeneralization to decrease with time as the severity of PTSD symptoms decreases. 
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Chapter 4: Implications of the research on conditioned fear generalization  
in PTSD and OCD 
This dissertation attempted to fill a gap in the fear conditioning literature by 
investigating the generalization of conditioned fear in PTSD and OCD. A review of the 
literature demonstrated a lack of research on fear-conditioning processes in OCD. 
Although those with OCD have been suggested to overgeneralize threat; no studies to 
date have investigated conditioned fear generalization processes in OCD. Chapter 2 
represents the first study that attempted to investigate the generalization of conditioned 
fear in individuals with obsessive-compulsive traits using startle EMG. The results of this 
study demonstrated that individuals with high levels of Threat Estimation as measured by 
the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44) displayed overgeneralization of fear 
responses to a greater range of stimuli resembling the danger cue than those with low 
levels of Threat Estimation. In particular, the high Threat Estimation group showed 
greater fear-potentiated startle to ring sizes up to two units of dissimilarity from the 
danger cue while the low Threat Estimation group did not generalize the conditioned fear 
response beyond the danger cue. This suggests that the high Threat Estimation group may 
be characterized by lower thresholds of threat reactivity, which results in greater fear 
responses to stimuli that resemble the danger cue.  
In addition, despite etiological theories proposing that fear conditioning and 
overgeneralization of fear play prominent roles in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD, little research had been done the neurobiological mechanisms that contribute to 
fear conditioning processes in PTSD patients. Chapter 3 investigated the neurobiological 
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substrates associated with the overgeneralization of conditioned fear in PTSD patients 
using skin conductance measures and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
This study provided evidence of overgeneralization of conditioned fear in PTSD patients 
in bilateral insula, dmPFC, and right and left caudate. 
The implications of these studies bring to bear several important points which 
merit further discussion. First, the lack of a significant difference in those with and 
without OC traits in terms of generalization brings to light the obvious but important 
point that fear conditioning processes  may not be relevant to all anxiety disorders. 
Second, these findings also suggest that identification of processes related to the 
generalization of conditioned fear that are common across anxiety disorders (such as 
overestimation of threat) may be beneficial to our understanding of generalization. Third, 
the differences in neural functioning found during conditioned fear between PTSD 
patients and controls raises the question of whether these differences reflect a risk factor 
or a consequence of the disorder. Last, the need for an integrative model of anxiety that 
incorporates non-associative learning processes will be discussed.   
Relevancy of Fear Conditioning Processes to PTSD and OCD 
Of the anxiety disorders, PTSD appears to have the most straightforward 
relationship with fear-conditioning processes. Based on the direct relationship between a 
traumatic event and the subsequent fear of trauma-relevant stimuli, the etiology of PTSD 
seems well accounted for by a fear conditioning model. In support of the fear 
conditioning model of PTSD, chapter 3 demonstrated the overgeneralization of 
conditioned fear in brain regions such as the insula, dmPFC, and right and left caudate in 
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PTSD patients compared to controls. Future directions in PTSD research would benefit 
from studies investigating the contribution of other associative fear learning theories to 
the maintenance of this disorder. For example, fear conditioning processes that have been 
understudied in PTSD include avoidance, extinction retention, and associative learning 
deficits.  
The current body of work also predicted that OCD would be characterized by 
overgeneralization; however, chapter 2 was only able to find evidence of 
overgeneralization in those high in Threat Estimation as measured by the OBQ-44. No 
differences in generalization were found when comparing individuals with high and low 
levels of overall obsessive-compulsive symptoms as measured by the Obsessive-
compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R). A noted limitation to this study was use of a 
non-clinical population of individuals with obsessive-compulsive traits rather than 
patients with OCD. Overgeneralization of conditioned fear may be more apparent in a 
study using clinical patients with OCD.  
As mentioned previously, the lack of group differences in the high and low 
obsessive-compulsive groups may also be due to the lack of disorder-relevant 
conditioned stimuli used in this study’s experimental paradigm. It has been noted that 
paradigms that use threat of shock as the unconditioned stimulus may not be as pertinent 
to anxiety disorders where threat of physical harm is not a key feature (Lissek, Pine, & 
Grillon, 2006). Fear of physical harm is thought to be characteristic of posttraumatic 
stress disorder but may be less relevant to obsessive-compulsive disorder. Experimental 
paradigms that use OCD-specific unconditioned stimuli such as contamination may be 
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more successful at finding group differences in fear responses in obsessive-compulsive 
populations.  
However, it is also possible that overgeneralization of conditioned fear is more 
relevant to particular anxiety disorders that are conceptualized as originating from fear 
conditioning processes such as PTSD, rather than OCD. Theoretically, fear conditioning 
accounts of OCD are underdeveloped and there is currently not enough empirical 
research on conditioned fear in these disorders to draw any conclusions about the merit, 
or lack thereof, of using fear conditioning processes to study OCD symptoms. In general, 
OCD is not conceptualized as originating from conditioned fear. Associative fear learning 
theories are based on the assumption that in order for fear conditioning to occur, there has 
to be an opportunity to associate stimuli with an aversive event. However, in the case of 
OCD, many patients appear to develop a fear response to a stimulus without recollection 
of an aversive experience.  
However, this does not mean that fear conditioning paradigms cannot be useful in 
studying this disorder. For example, those with OCD may show abnormalities in 
conditioned fear processes which provide valuable information about how fear is 
processed in this disorder. In particular, greater avoidance (via compulsions) leading to 
failure to extinguish fear may be especially relevant to OCD. The efficacy of exposure 
and response prevention therapy for OCD, a treatment modality that aims to extinguish 
the fear response, supports the association between OCD and fear conditioning processes 
such as extinction. Additional research using fear conditioning paradigms with OCD 
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patients is necessary before inferences can be made about the role of fear conditioning 
processes in the maintenance of this disorder.  
Relation of Conditioned Fear Generalization to Processes Common Across 
Disorders 
Most studies on the generalization of conditioned fear focus on healthy 
participants or disorder-specific group differences. Although this approach has advanced 
our understanding of generalization in different anxiety disorders, an advantageous next 
step may be to identify processes related to the generalization of conditioned fear that are 
common across anxiety disorders (such as overestimation of threat). Knowledge about 
how anxiety disorders differ from one another and from healthy participants is important 
and valid work. But understanding the underlying processes that lead to 
overgeneralization may help elucidate why some anxiety disorders show 
overgeneralization while others do not. 
For example, chapter 2 did not find differences in generalization between 
individuals with high and low levels obsessive-compulsive symptoms as measured by the 
Obsessive-compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R). Instead, this study found that 
overgeneralization was restricted to the high in Threat Estimation group as measured by 
the OBQ-44. As mentioned previously, the finding of greater generalization in the high 
Threat Estimation group compared to the low Threat Estimation group and no differences 
in the high and low obsessive-compulsive groups may be due to overestimation of threat 
being non-specific to OCD. It has been shown that threat estimation does not reliably 
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differentiate OCD patients from other anxiety patients (Anholt et al., 2006; Clark, 
Purdon, & Wang, 2003; Sica et al., 2004; Tolin, Worhunsky, & Maltby, 2006).  
Overestimation of threat is implicated in many anxiety disorders including GAD, 
PTSD, and panic disorder. Excessive threat estimation may be one process common 
across many anxiety disorders that contributes to the overgeneralization of conditioned 
fear. Furthermore, differences in generalization between anxiety groups may reflect 
differences in the levels of threat estimation between each disorder which would explain 
why some anxiety disorders show overgeneralization while others do not. For example, 
perhaps PTSD patients show a greater propensity to overestimate threat than OCD 
patients, which would explain why PTSD patients and not those with OC traits show 
overgeneralization of conditioned fear. Hypotheses such as these require further 
investigation. Although research investigating processes common across anxiety 
disorders that underlie the generalization of conditioned fear is in its infancy, it provides 
a promising area for future work. 
Overgeneralization: Risk Factor or Result of the Disorder? 
Chapter 3 demonstrated evidence of overgeneralization in PTSD patients 
compared to controls in bilateral insula, dmPFC, and right and left caudate which raises 
the question of whether these differences reflect a risk factor for developing pathological 
anxiety or whether they are a consequence of the disorder. In other words, impaired 
mechanisms of conditioned fear generalization may contribute to the development of 
anxiety disorders such as PTSD (risk factor) or deficits may arise from the anxiety 
disorder itself (acquired trait). There is some evidence that pre-trauma hypersensitivity to 
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contextual threat, enhanced fear responses to explicit threat, and failure to habituate to 
aversive stimuli are predictive of post-trauma symptoms of PTSD (Pole et al., 2009), 
suggesting the existence of pre-morbid risk factors for PTSD. Conversely, a twin study 
found that deficits in extinction retention in PTSD patients were not present in their co-
twins, suggesting these deficits were acquired post-trauma rather than representing a 
vulnerability factor (Milad et al., 2008). Future work would benefit from prospective 
studies focusing on the generalization of conditioned fear in order to determine whether 
greater generalization predicts an increased risk for anxiety disorders such as PTSD. 
However, it is likely a complex interaction of risk factors (genetic, environmental, 
neurobiological, etc.) that influences the manifestation of pathological anxiety. For 
example, not all individuals who experience a traumatic event will develop PTSD; rather, 
a vulnerability to developing an anxiety disorder is also required. Additional research is 
needed on the specific vulnerabilities that influence conditioned fear processes such as 
generalization. We do know that individual differences in the development of conditioned 
fear are influenced by past experience. Specifically, non-fearful encounters experienced 
either directly or vicariously can hinder the development of conditioned fear. For 
example, animal research demonstrates that rhesus monkeys that observe other monkeys 
responding non-fearfully to a snake are less likely to develop conditioned fear to snakes 
(Mineka & Cook, 1986; 1993). Specific vulnerabilities and the protective effects of 
experience explain why not all aversive experiences result in the development of an 
anxiety disorder. The exact nature of the vulnerabilities that lead to the development of 
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abnormalities in fear conditioning processes is another area in need of additional 
research. 
Beyond Fear Conditioning: the Need for an Integrative Model of Anxiety 
 An integrative model of anxiety that incorporates both associative and non-
associative learning processes is needed in order to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the processes that lead to the development and maintenance of 
pathological anxiety. Critics of conditioned fear theories argue that fear conditioning 
processes are not the only means by which pathological anxiety can be developed and 
maintained. In contrast to fear conditioning accounts of pathological anxiety, others have 
suggested the importance of non-associative learning mechanisms in the maintenance of 
anxiety. While associative learning accounts focus the association of a neutral stimulus 
with a positive or negative outcome that influences behavioral responses, non-associative 
learning theories are based on the idea that changes in a behavioral response to a stimulus 
occur in the absence of positive or negative outcomes.  
Two prominent non-associative learning accounts include habituation and 
sensitization. Habituation refers to a decrease in a behavioral response to a stimulus over 
time following repeated exposure to that stimulus, while sensitization refers to an 
increase in a behavioral response with repeated exposure to a stimulus. Deficits in the 
ability to habituate to feared stimuli and/or increased sensitization to feared stimuli are 
important but understudied contributors to pathological anxiety. Habituation and 
sensitization are not incompatible with fear conditioning theories and it is likely that 
deficits in habituation and excessive sensitization interact with fear conditioning 
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processes in the maintenance of pathological anxiety. Future research on pathological 
anxiety would benefit from additional studies designed to measure non-associative 
learning principles. However, research paradigms are needed that can disentangle the 
relative contributions of associative and non-associative learning processes.  
Conclusion   
In conclusion, this body of work aimed to address the lack of studies on the 
generalization of conditioned fear in OCD and PTSD. The results discussed in chapter 2 
suggest that the generalization of conditioned fear may not be relevant to all anxiety 
disorders based on the lack of a significant difference in those with and without OC traits. 
Future work using clinical patients with OCD and/or OCD-specific unconditioned stimuli 
to explore generalization effects may better be able to find group differences. However, 
this study was able to demonstrate greater generalization in those who overestimate threat 
and it was suggested that the identification of processes related to the generalization of 
conditioned fear that are common across anxiety disorders (such as overestimation of 
threat) may refine our understanding of generalization effects. Additionally, future 
research would benefit from exploring other fear conditioning processes that may be 
especially relevant to OCD such as extinction.  
Furthermore, chapter 3 demonstrated that PTSD patients shown 
overgeneralization of conditioned fear in bilateral insula, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, 
and right and left caudate. It remains unclear whether these differences in neural 
functioning represent a risk factor or a consequence of the disorder; therefore it was 
suggested that prospective studies focusing on the generalization of conditioned fear be 
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conducted in order to determine whether greater generalization predicts an increased risk 
for anxiety disorders such as PTSD. Additionally, future directions in PTSD research 
would benefit from studies investigating other understudied associative fear learning 
theories such as avoidance, extinction retention, and associative learning deficits. And 
finally, the refinement of current theoretical accounts of pathological anxiety with the 
integration associative learning theories with non-associative learning processes (e.g., 
habituation, sensitization) is needed in order to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the processes that lead to the development and maintenance of 
pathological anxiety. 
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